MLG RUSHED TKOF THEN AT ALT TURNED OFF APU WITHOUT GENERATORS ON. LOST ELECTRICAL AND PRESSURIZATION.

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WHILE TAXIING FOR TKOF AT MFR; THE WX WENT BELOW TKOF MINIMUMS IN FOG. WE SHUT THE ENGS DOWN AT THE END OF THE RWY. WHEN THE WX IMPROVED SUFFICIENTLY 30 MINS LATER; THE CAPT WANTED TO START THE ENGS IMMEDIATELY (BEING A 'HURRY-UP' TYPE); BUT I INSISTED ON RUNNING THROUGH THE BEFORE START CHKLIST. AFTER START; HE TOLD THE TWR THAT WE WERE READY TO GO; AND WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF; I HURRIEDLY WENT THROUGH MY COCKPIT FLOWS; AND WAS READING THE LENGTHY BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST WHILE THE CAPT TAXIED ONTO THE RWY. (THIS IS A NEW CHKLIST THAT HAS BEEN IMPOSED ON ALL FLEETS. IT HAS RECEIVED NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS FOR BEING LENGTHY; DISJOINTED; AND REQUIRING TOO MUCH TO BE DONE WHILE MOVING. IT ALSO HAS OMITTED SOME IMPORTANT ITEMS.) AS I WAS 'HEAD-DOWN' ACCOMPLISHING AND READING THE FINAL ITEMS ON THE CHKLIST; THE CAPT BEGAN HIS TKOF WITHOUT VERIFYING THAT THEY WERE COMPLETE. (THEY WEREN'T. THE ANTI-SKID WAS OFF. I CORRECTED THIS AT 80 KTS.) THE DEP OUT OF MFR IS COMPLICATED; REQUIRING INTERCEPTING AN NDB; VOR RADIAL; AND VOR ARC; WHILE RPTING ALTS IN A NON-RADAR ENVIRONMENT. AT 23000 FT; THE CAPT TURNED OFF THE APU; AND WE LOST ELECTRICAL PWR SINCE HE HAD FORGOTTEN TO PUT THE GENERATORS ON THE LINE BEFORE THE TKOF. WE THEN HAD A LOSS OF PRESSURIZATION FROM THE PWR INTERRUPTION; WHICH WE DIDN'T NOTICE UNTIL THE CABIN ALT WARNING HORN WENT OFF. I CORRECTED THE PROB BEFORE WE HAD TO DSND. THE APU WAS ON THE OLD CHKLIST; AND SAID; 'VERIFY WITH CAPT;' BEFORE TURNING IT OFF. HAD WE BEEN IN WX; WE WOULD HAVE BEEN IN TROUBLE. THIS NEW; FLAWED CHKLIST COUPLED WITH THE 'HURRY-UP' ATTITUDE OF MANY CAPTS IS A VERY UNSAFE COMBINATION.