CAB ATTENDANTS STANDING IN AISLE AT BEGINNING OF TKOF ROLL.
Synopsis
CAB ATTENDANTS STANDING IN AISLE AT BEGINNING OF TKOF ROLL.
Narrative
I WAS FO ON A FLT FROM DAL TO MAF. AFTER WE WERE AIRBORNE; AND WELL ABOVE 10000 FT; THE C FLT ATTENDANT CAME FORWARD AND TOLD THE CAPT THAT SHE AND THE A FLT ATTENDANT WERE STANDING IN THE AISLE WHEN WE STARTED OUR TKOF ROLL. THIS MAY NOT SOUND LIKE MUCH; BUT IT IS OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO BE SURE THE ACFT IS SECURE PRIOR TO TKOF. THE FLT ATTENDANTS HAD A PROB PAX THAT WOULD NOT LET THEM SECURE A BAG PRIOR TO TKOF. THE A FLT ATTENDANT THOUGHT HE COULD TAKE CARE OF THE PROB QUICKLY AND DID NOT OPEN THE COCKPIT DOOR TO LET US KNOW WHAT WAS GOING ON. WE (THE COCKPIT CREW) HAD ALREADY GIVEN THE TKOF WARNING 1 MIN PRIOR TO TKOF. THE FLT ATTENDANT WAS UNABLE TO GET TO THE COCKPIT DOOR WHEN HE REALIZED HE HAD RUN OUT OF TIME. WE NEED A PROC CHANGE AT ACR TO CORRECT THIS KIND OF PROB; AND GET THE FLT DECK CREW BACK INTO THE LOOP. WE ARE THE ONLY AIRLINE THAT I KNOW OF THAT HAS THE FLT ATTENDANTS CLOSE THE COCKPIT DOOR PRIOR TO HAVING THE CABIN SECURE FOR TKOF. HAD OUR PROC BEEN TO CLOSE THE COCKPIT DOOR ONLY AFTER THE CABIN WAS SECURE; WE WOULD HAVE NEVER TAKEN THE RWY. THE FLT ATTENDANTS SIMPLY DID NOT HAVE TIME TO GET BACK TO THE FRONT AND OPEN THE DOOR TO TELL US THERE WAS A PROB. IT WAS ALSO INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT WHEN ASKED; THE FLT ATTENDANTS SAID THEY WERE AWARE OF THE FACT THEY HAD THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD THE ACFT ON THE GND UNTIL THE CABIN WAS SECURE; BUT WERE AFRAID TO USE THAT AUTHORITY FOR FEAR OF BEING CHEWED OUT BY A CAPT. THE VERY PEOPLE THAT COULD KEEP US 'IN THE LOOP' AND OUT OF TROUBLE AREA AFRAID TO COME FORWARD AND STATE THEY NEED MORE TIME! A LITTLE MORE COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT IN THIS AREA MAY BE NEEDED AS WELL.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.