MLG HAS ENG WHICH DOES NOT RESPOND TO THROTTLE CHANGES.
Synopsis
MLG HAS ENG WHICH DOES NOT RESPOND TO THROTTLE CHANGES.
Narrative
ON THE MAJIC 7 STAR FOR ARR AT CLT; ATC INSTRUCTED OUR FLT TO BEGIN DSCNT FROM FL280 AND TO MAINTAIN BEST FORWARD AIRSPD. DURING THE PWR-ON DSCNT; THE CAPT NOTICED THE ENGS WERE OUT OF SYNC AND ATTEMPTED TO CORRECT THE CONDITION. IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE L ENG WAS NOT RESPONDING TO THE THROTTLE CHANGES. THE FLT DSNDED WITH THE L ENG AT APPROX 1.65 EPR TO 10000 FT. DURING THE INITIAL PORTION OF THE DSCNT; WE MONITORED THE AFFECTED ENG TO SEE IF; AT SOME POINT; IT MAY BEGIN TO RESPOND TO THROTTLE CHANGES. REACHING THE DOWNWIND AND HAVING BEEN CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH; IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE ONLY WAY TO REDUCE THE PWR ON THE AFFECTED ENG WAS TO REMOVE PWR FROM IT ALTOGETHER. THE TWR WAS NOTIFIED THAT THE FLT WAS ON A SINGLE ENG AND THAT WE WERE NEITHER DECLARING AN EMER NOR REQUESTING ANY ASSISTANCE (I.E.; CRASH FIRE RESCUE TRUCKS). WE ACCOMPLISHED THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS; SHUT DOWN THE AFFECTED ENG; AND FLEW A SINGLE-ENG VISUAL APCH AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. UPON ARR AT THE GATE; MAINT RESEARCHED THE PROB AND FOUND THE THROTTLE CABLE TO BE DISCONNECTED FROM THE FUEL CTL UNIT. IN REVIEWING THE INCIDENT; THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED IF IT MIGHT HAVE ENHANCED THE SIT TO HAVE DECLARED AN EMER AT THE POINT WE REMOVED PWR FROM THE AFFECTED ENG DURING THE APCH. WE EACH AGREED THAT GIVEN THE WX CONDITIONS AND THE FLT'S POS RELATIVE TO THE ARPT; THIS DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN EMER SIT. OTHER DISCUSSION WITH VARIOUS LINE AND SUPERVISORY PLTS DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN EMER SIT. OTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH VARIOUS LINE AND SUPERVISORY PLTS REVEALED A DISCREPANCY BTWN PERCEPTIONS AMONG THESE PLTS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT WE WOULD HAVE BEEN OBLIGATED TO DECLARE AN EMER BY VIRTUE OF THE FACT THAT WE WERE CONDUCTING A PORTION OF THE FLT ON A SINGLE ENG. UPON REVIEWING THE FARS; WE FOUND NO REF REGARDING THE NECESSITY TO DECLARE AN EMER IN SUCH A SIT. AN ARGUMENT WAS PUT FORTH BY ONE PLT THAT BECAUSE WE USED A PORTION OF AN EMER CHKLIST; AND IN CONSIDERATION OF THE WORDING IN OUR COMPANY FLT OPS MANUAL REGARDING CLASSIFICATION OF EMERS; THAT A CASE COULD BE MADE THAT WE SHOULD HAVE DECLARED AN EMER IN THIS INSTANCE. LOOKING BACK AT THE EVENT; THE CONSERVATIVE OPTION WOULD HAVE BEEN TO DECLARE AN EMER AND TO REQUEST THAT THE CRASH FIRE RESCUE EQUIP BE STANDING BY FOR OUR LNDG. WHAT WAS A NEAR-ROUTINE LNDG COULD HAVE DEGENERATED INTO SOMETHING LESS THAN A ROUTINE SIT IF; FOR ANY REASON; WE NEEDED TO EXECUTE A GAR WITH A SINGLE ENG OR ENCOUNTERED SOME OTHER DIFFICULTY WITH THE ACFT DURING THE LNDG. THE SPECTER OF CAUSING ATC TO ALTER THEIR OPS AND FOR THE CRASH FIRE RESCUE CREW TO DEMOBILIZED DIDN'T SEEM WARRANTED AT THE TIME; BUT MAY HAVE BEEN WELCOME IF WE HAD ENCOUNTERED ANY OTHER PROBS. THEY ARE ALL THERE AT OUR SVC AND IT DOESN'T HURT TO CALL ON THEM AS A PRECAUTION. THE IDEA OF HAVING TO EXPLAIN WHY WE DIDN'T REQUEST THEIR ASSISTANCE IF ANYTHING HAD HAPPENED UPON LNDG WOULD NOT BE EASY.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.