TKOF ABORTED IN B-737-500. TKOF PROC.

Narrative

ACFT WAS TAXIED OUT SINGLE ENG TO CONSERVE FUEL. CREW ANTICIPATED RWY 32L AND HAD PRESET PROGRAMMED MODE CTL PANEL AND FMC ACCORDINGLY. DURING TAXI-OUT; CREW ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO RWY 9L. CREW THEN BECAME VERY BUSY REPROGRAMMING COMPUTERS; REFING TAXI CHARTS; STARTING 2ND ENG; NOTIFYING FLT ATTENDANTS OF IMPENDING TKOF; SWITCHING RADIO FREQS; FOLLOWING NORMAL FLOW PATTERNS OF CONFIGURING ACFT FOR TKOF; INCLUDING POSITIONING OF FLAPS; AND RUNNING BEFORE TKOF CHKLISTS. AIRLINE 737 300 AND 500 SERIES ACFT UTILIZE FLAPS POS 1 FOR TKOF 95 PERCENT OF ALL TKOFS (APPROX). THIS PARTICULAR 737-500 HAD NOT BEEN MODIFIED TO ACCEPT FLAPS 1 TKOFS AS MOST PREVIOUSLY HAD. CREW; DURING ITS RUSH; ACCIDENTALLY SET FLAPS TO POS 1 VERSUS PLANNED POS 5. DURING CHKLIST (FO READS; CAPT RESPONDS) CAPT ACKNOWLEDGED FLAPS POS 1 AND FO (WHO HAD ORIGINALLY POSITIONED FLAPS) DID NOT CATCH ERROR. TKOF WAS INITIATED AND DISCONTINUED DUE TO TKOF WARNING HORN. CREW DISCOVERED ERROR AND RETAXIED FOR 2ND TKOF ATTEMPT. CREW BELIEVES 2 LARGEST PROBS WERE RUSHED DEP (AGGRAVATED BY DELAYING STARTING OF 2ND ENG) AND COMPLACENCY OF ACCEPTING 'NORMAL' RESPONSES TO CHKLIST ITEMS AND NOT VERIFYING 'CORRECT' POS.