NMAC BTWN AN MLG ON DSCNT OUTSIDE OF AN ARSA AND AN SMA ON A CONVERGING COURSE AT AN UNKNOWN ALT.

Narrative

WE WERE CLRED TO KLIDE FIX FOR SJC RWY 30L APCH AND INTERCEPT LOC. A CALL WAS GIVEN THAT WE HAD A TARGET 12 O'CLOCK; ALT UNKNOWN 'APPEARS OPPOSITE DIRECTION.' I WAS BUSY WITH THE APCH NAV AND DID NOT HEAR THE CONVERSATION WITH COPLT AND CTLR. WE DID NOT RECEIVE ANY UPDATE FROM CTLR AFTER INITIAL CALL. I LOOKED UP FROM NAVING TO SEE ACFT (SINGLE ENG BEECH) GOING R TO L AT OUR ALT; 11 O'CLOCK; 200 FT. I THINK THE COPLT SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE DILIGENT IN FOLLOWING THROUGH WITH UPDATES ON CONTACT BEARING AND DISTANCE. I SHOULD NOT HAVE LET MYSELF BE TAKEN OUT OF LOOP OF CONVERSATION AND THE CTLR; ALTHOUGH HE SUPPOSEDLY FOLLOWED HIS DIRECTIVES OF TURNING IT OVER TO US ONCE WE WERE NOTIFIED; COULD HAVE DONE A BETTER JOB OF MAKING SURE WE WERE AWARE OR FOLLOWING THE CONVERGENCE TRACK. THE FAA MIGHT BE BETTER SERVING THE PUBLIC BY REQUIRING MORE ACFT TO OPERATE WITH XPONDERS IF THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT WITH ACRS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HE HAD TALKED WITH THE TRACON AFTER THE NMAC TO LEARN WHY THE CTLR DID NOT FOLLOW-UP ON ADVISING THAT THE OTHER TFC WAS STILL ON A COLLISION COURSE. HE ALSO BELIEVES THAT EVERY ACFT SHOULD BE EQUIPPED WITH A XPONDER WITH AN ALT READOUT. HE WAS ADVISED THAT SINCE THE ALT OF THE TFC WAS UNKNOWN; AND THAT IT HAD BEEN POINTED OUT TO THE FLC; THE CTLR COULD BE BUSY WITH OTHER DUTIES AND NOT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE AN UPDATE ON THE CONVERGING TFC. HE BELIEVES THAT THE CTLR'S WORKLOAD WAS VERY LIGHT THAT EARLY EVENING AND SHOULD HAVE HAD PLENTY OF TIME TO GIVE 'UPDATES.' WITH THAT IN MIND; IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT HE VISIT THE LCL TRACON FOR A FIRSTHAND LOOK AT THE CTLR WORKLOAD AND DUTIES; SINCE ALL THE FLC HEAR IS NOT ALL THAT THE CTLR IS ACTUALLY DOING AT THE MOMENT. (HE FURTHER STATED THAT THE ACFT WAS AN MD88.)