ALT XING RESTR NOT MET.

Narrative

TPA-IAD FL330 RECEIVED CLRNC TO CROSS 85 S FAK AT FL270. FO (PF) ENTERED 65 MI INTO FMC. I (CAPT PNF) DID NOT DOUBLE CHK. ABOUT TIME WE WERE TO START DSCNT; CTLR ASKED IF WE HAD RECEIVED ABOVE CLRNC. I REPLIED AFFIRMATIVE AND THE CTLR REPLIED 'YOU MISSED IT.' WE STARTED DOWN AND WERE HANDED OFF TO NEXT SECTOR WHERE CTLR TOLD US THERE WAS NO CONFLICTING TFC. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 2 HR DELAY AT TPA ACCT LCL WX. NUMEROUS DEVS ACCT WX IN N FL AND S GA. MANY INTL CONNECTIONS ABOARD. PNF BUSY COORDINATING WITH FLT ATTENDANT WITH IAD AIRBORNE GATE CTLR. THIS GREATLY REDUCED PNF BACKUP/SUPPORT ROLE. THIS PUT PF INTO PNF DUTIES. PF GOT ATIS AND LONG LIST OF NOTAMS INCLUDING RWY 1R OF QUESTIONABLE LEGALITY. THIS WORKLOAD SATURATION; COMBINED WITH LACK OF DOUBLE CHK BY PNF; RESULTED IN HUMAN ERROR. IN RETROSPECT; I (CAPT AND PNF) SHOULD HAVE TOLD FLT ATTENDANT TO FORGET CONNECTIONS. I EFFECTIVELY FAILED TO PRIORITIZE ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT A CONSCIOUS DECISION. FURTHER COMPLICATION: BECAUSE FO; PF WAS AN EXCELLENT AND THOROUGH PLT; I ALLOWED MY BACKUP XCHK TO SLIP. ACR CONSTANTLY PREACHES 'FLY THE PLANE FIRST.' HOWEVER; I TEND TO CONSIDER THAT IN THE LOWER ALT STRUCTURE AND/OR INVOLVING IRREGULARITIES. THAT ADMONITION IS NOW REINFORCED FOR ALL ASPECTS OF THIS ENVIRONMENT. FINALLY; THIS IS A FUNCTION OF 2 PLT VERSUS 3 PLT WORKLOAD. HAD A FLT ENG BEEN INVOLVED WITH MISCONNECT DETAILS; I AM CONFIDENT THIS WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. FOR THE FUTURE; PAX SVC WILL BE A CASUALTY OF 2 PLT CREWS.