PLTDEV--LOSS OF SEPARATION BTWN CPR A AND ACR B AS A RESULT OF TCASII EVASIVE ACTION BY BOTH ACFT. CPR A WAS BEING SEQUENCED TO FOLLOW ACR B INTRAIL FROM THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION.

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WE (CPR A) WERE LEVEL AT 2500 FT ON A 270 DEG HDG BEING VECTORED FOR AN ILS RWY 36 AT DCA. JUST PRIOR TO INTERCEPTING THE LOC WE RECEIVED A TA ON THE TCASII. WE LOOKED FOR THE TFC BUT DUE TO THE HAZE INFLT WE WERE UNABLE TO SEE THE INTRUDER ACFT (ACR B). (HE WAS LEVEL AT OUR ALT.) WE ASSUMED THAT HE WAS THE TFC WE WERE FOLLOWING. ABOUT 10 SECONDS AFTER THE TA; WE RECEIVED AN RA. OUR COMMAND WAS TO DSND MORE THAN 2000 FPM; IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE RA (ABOUT 2 SECONDS) WE SAW THE INTRUDER ACFT. AN A-320; IN ABOUT A 20 DEG L BANK AND CLBING. (GOING THROUGH A 080 DEG HDG). WE INITIATED A L TURN AND A 2000 FT PLUS RATE OF DSCNT. ABOUT 2-3 SECONDS AFTER THE RA; THE CTLR ADVISED US TO TURN IMMEDIATELY L TO A 180 DEG HDG FOR TFC. I ADVISED HIM WE HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT. ON LNDG THE CAPT CONTACTED APCH CTL ON THE LANDLINE AND WAS GIVEN THE FOLLOWING EXPLANATION. TRAINING WAS BEING DONE ON THE W SIDE OF THE LOC. WE WERE BEING VECTORED BY THE E CTLR FOR AN ILS TO RWY 36. WE WERE TO FOLLOW THE A-320. THE INSTRUCTOR-CTLR FELT THERE WAS ADEQUATE SEPARATION BTWN US BUT WHEN THE A-320 RECEIVED THE RA; HE WAS IN A L TURN TO A 020 DEG HDG; (HE STOPPED THE TURN; AND BEGAN HIS CLB TO RESPOND TO THE RA). THE CTLR FELT THE RA FROM THE TCASII CONTRIBUTED TO THE LESS THAN A HALF MI SEPARATION (I BELIEVE) THAT EXISTED. I COMPLETELY DISAGREE WITH THE CTLR ON THE TCASII MAKING THE SEPARATION WORSE. WE WERE ALREADY MUCH TOO CLOSE WHEN BOTH ACFT RECEIVED AN RA. I BELIEVE THE CTLR DID NOT WANT TO ADMIT THE ERROR FOR WHATEVER REASON. OBVIOUSLY WE BELIEVE IN TCASII.