A CFI FOULED UP THE TFC PATTERN.
Synopsis
A CFI FOULED UP THE TFC PATTERN.
Narrative
THIS WAS A TRAINING FLT WITH A FLT INSTRUCTOR FOR THE PURPOSES OF MAINTAINING INST CURRENCY. THIS WAS THE FIRST FLT WITH THIS PARTICULAR FLT INSTRUCTOR; WHO HAD JUST MOVED TO THE AREA AND STARTED INSTRUCTING THERE THAT WK. WHILE RETURNING TO THE DEP ARPT (CLASS D AIRSPACE); INSTRUCTOR SUGGESTED A PRACTICE SIMULATED NO-GYRO ASR APCH. INSTRUCTOR COVERED PRIMARY GYRO INSTS; DISABLED ELECTRONIC ON-BOARD NAV AIDS; AND ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ATC COMS. INSTRUCTOR HAD ALREADY ASSUMED TFC SCAN AND AVOIDANCE RESPONSIBILITIES; SINCE I WAS AND CONTINUED TO BE UNDER THE HOOD FOR MOST OF THE FLT. APPROX 6 NM N OF THE ARPT AND 3000 FT AGL; INSTRUCTOR CONTACTED THE TWR; INFORMED THEM OF SIMULATED ASR APCH TO RWY 29; AND WAS TOLD TO RPT ON 5 MI FINAL TO RWY 29. IT'S POSSIBLE THAT THE LCL CTLR UNDERSTOOD OR MISUNDERSTOOD THE REQUEST AS A SIMULATED VOR APCH TO RWY 29; GIVEN THE ENTRY/RPTING POINT GIVEN. INSTRUCTOR PROCEEDED TO ASSIGN HDG AND ALTS; WHICH I FOLLOWED. THOUGH I DIDN'T MAKE ANY CONCERTED EFFORTS TO INTERP THE SIMULATED VECTORS AND ALT ASSIGNMENTS; THEY APPEARED TO BE FOR A R DOWNWIND; BASE; FINAL ENTRY TO RWY 29. WHILE ON A HDG CONSISTENT WITH A BASE LEG; INSTRUCTOR ASSIGNED 500 FT MSL (APPROX 500 FT AGL). I QUESTIONED INSTRUCTOR AS TO THE LOW ALT; BUT WAS NOT ASSERTIVE AND ACCEPTED IT WHEN HE INSISTED ON THE ALT. SHORTLY AFTER A HDG ASSIGNMENT OF 290 (RWY HDG); INSTRUCTOR ASSIGNED 400 FT MSL. THAT SEEMED REALLY LOW TO ME GIVEN THE 5 MI FINAL RPT REQUESTED BY THE LCL CTLR. I DID NOT QUESTION THE INSTRUCTOR; AND HE PROCEEDED TO CALL TWR AND RPTED ESTABLISHED ON A 5 MI FINAL FOR RWY 29. TWR THEN INSTRUCTED US TO FOLLOW A GULFSTREAM JET ON A 2 MI FINAL. INSTRUCTOR RPTED TO THE TWR THAT THE JET WAS NOT IN SIGHT. AT THIS TIME I DECIDED TO LIFT THE HOOD AND LOOK FOR THE ARPT; RWY AND TFC. I IMMEDIATELY SAW THAT WE WERE NOT ON 5 MI FINAL BUT IN FACT ON A 1 MI FINAL TO RWY 29. AS I FORCEFULLY TOLD THAT TO INSTRUCTOR; THE LCL CTLR TOLD US TO START AN IMMEDIATE R TURN; WHICH I DID. THE GULFSTREAM PLT THEN RPTED THAT HE HAD TFC AHEAD BUT 'OUT OF THE WAY NOW;' AND WE CIRCLED AROUND TO REJOIN THE FINAL AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. I COULD NOT BELIEVE A FLT INSTRUCTOR WOULD MAKE SUCH MISTAKES. A 1 MI FINAL CANNOT POSSIBLY BE MISTAKEN TO BE A 5 MI FINAL -- OR SO I THOUGHT. IT ALSO BECAME APPARENT TO ME; ONCE I RAISED THE HOOD AND DETERMINED OUR TRUE POS; THAT WE MOST LIKELY FLEW UNNECESSARILY LOW OVER HOMES; BUILDINGS AND A HWY. WE MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE FLOWN LESS THAN 500 FT ABOVE THEM; BUT WE CERTAINLY OPERATED AGAINST REASONABLE SAFETY AND NOISE ABATEMENT PROCS. WHAT UPSET ME THE MOST; IS THAT I INSIST ON A CERTIFIED INSTRUCTOR (INSTEAD OF JUST A PVT SAFETY PLT) FOR ALL SIMULATED IFR TRAINING FOR SAFETY AND QUALITY REASONS. MY LESSONS FROM THIS ARE: 1) DON'T ASSUME THAT FLT INSTRUCTORS KNOW BEST OR HAVE ALWAYS GOOD JUDGEMENT. 2) MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS; EVEN WHEN GIVEN VECTORS IN VFR CONDITIONS; BE IT ATC OR SIMULATED VECTORS. 3) QUESTION ANY VECTOR AND/OR ALT ASSIGNMENT THAT DOES NOT SEEM APPROPRIATE; AGAIN BE THEY ATC OR SIMULATED. 4) BE ASSERTIVE AND INSIST ON AN EXPLANATION ONCE I DECIDE A CLRNC MUST BE QUESTIONED. 5) WHEN THERE IS DOUBT ABOUT THE SAFE OUTCOME OF A SIT; START IMMEDIATELY THE MOST CONSERVATIVE CORRECTIVE ACTION; AND INFORM INSTRUCTORS; ATC; OF THE ACTION AND REASON FOR THE ACTION.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.