MLG TAXIING; TAXIES BEYOND HOLD LINE AND ALMOST ONTO RWY.

Date: 1994-11 · Aircraft: Fokker 100

Anomalies: other-unspecified

Synopsis

MLG TAXIING; TAXIES BEYOND HOLD LINE AND ALMOST ONTO RWY.

Narrative

THIS WAS MY FIRST ARR INTO BWI SINCE CONSTRUCTION BEGAN ON THE RAMP AND THE INNER TXWY. AFTER A NIGHT LNDG ON RWY 33L -- WE EXITED THE RWY ON TXWY F AND FOLLOWED GND CTL'S INSTRUCTIONS TO TAXI TO OUR GATE VIA THE OUTER TXWY AND TXWY C. I TAXIED SLOWLY BECAUSE I WAS HAVING TROUBLE FINDING THE SIGNS LABELING THE VARIOUS TXWYS WE WERE TO USE OR CROSS. I KNEW THE OUTER TXWY MADE A HALF L TURN AT TXWY P. AT THAT POINT -- I STARTED TO FOLLOW A TAXI LINE THAT CURVED OFF TO THE L. AT THIS TIME; THE FO; WHO HAD BEEN TO BWI RECENTLY -- WARNED ME THAT I WAS ABOUT TO ENTER RWY 4/22. I IMMEDIATELY TURNED FARTHER L AND REINTERCEPTED THE OUTER TXWY AND PROCEEDED TO PARKING. DURING THE TURN TO REINTERCEPT THE OUTER TXWY; I NOTICED THAT THE ACFT HAD CROSSED THE HOLD LINE A SMALL AMOUNT BUT NO PART OF THE ACFT ACTUALLY EXTENDED OVER THE RWY ITSELF. A NUMBER OF HUMAN FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT. I HAD NEVER TAKEN THAT PARTICULAR RTE TO PARKING BEFORE. ALL THE CONSTRUCTION AND LIGHTED BARRICADES ON AND AROUND THE INNER TXWY MADE IT HARDER TO STAY POS ORIENTED. I WAS TRYING SO HARD TO FIND THE BOUNDARIES OF THE OUTER TXWY THAT I FAILED TO NOTICE THE RWY HOLD LINE. I SHOULD BE ABLE TO OVERCOME THESE FACTORS IN THE FUTURE BY INCREASED VIGILANCE AND BETTER PRIOR PLANNING. ANOTHER HUMAN FACTOR; AN ALERT FO; PREVENTED A MORE SERIOUS INCIDENT. SOME OTHER FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT. TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE; NEITHER THE NOTAMS NOR THE ATIS MENTIONED THE MAJOR CONSTRUCTION ON THE INNER TXWY ON THE S AND SW PART OF THE RAMP. PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THIS WOULD HAVE HELPED ME PLAN MY TAXI BETTER. THE PAGE 10-9 DEPICTION OF TXWY P AT THE CORNER OF THE OUTER TXWY AND THE ENTRANCE TO RWY 4/22 IS MISLEADING. THE PAVEMENT AT THE RWY ENTRANCE IS MUCH WIDER THAN IT SEEMS ON THE DEPICTION -- MAKING A TURN ONTO THE NE SIDE OF THE PAVEMENT TO SEEM LIKE STAYING ON THE OUTER TXWY. THIS AREA IS NOT SHOWN ON PAGE 10-9B. BEING ABLE TO SEE THE DEPICTION OF THE SUBJECT INTXN IN GREATER DETAIL WOULD HAVE MADE IT MUCH EASIER TO FOLLOW THE OUTER TXWY. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THE 10-9B PAGE BE CHANGED TO INCLUDE THIS INTXN. THE RED RWY SIGN APPEARED TO SET WELL TO THE NE OF TXWY P. IF IT WERE SET CLOSER TO THE TXWY -- IT MIGHT HAVE CAUGHT MY ATTN BEFORE I CROSSED THE HOLD LINE. IF THERE WAS A RED RWY SIGN TO THE SW OF TXWY P; I DID NOT NOTICE IT. PLACING OR ENHANCING A RED RWY SIGN THERE WOULD ALSO HELP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT GND WAS COMPLETELY OBLIVIOUS TO THE PROB AND FLC CORRECTED IT THEMSELVES. HE BELIEVES CTLR WAS WORKING 2 POS. THEY NEVER REALLY GOT ONTO THE RWY BUT 'COULD' HAVE AND THUS RPTR CONCERN. THIS IS A LARGE AREA OF PAVEMENT AND DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE SO FROM THE ARPT DIAGRAM. THERE IS ALSO A PAGE 10-9B THAT IS A BLOW UP OF THE GATE AREA AND CUTS OFF JUST PRIOR TO THE 'P' TXWY INTERCHANGE. IF THE 'P' TXWY AREA COULD BE INCLUDED ON THIS BLOW UP IT WOULD HELP A GREAT DEAL TO IDENT THE COMPLEXITY OF THE INTXN. RPTR ALSO STATES THE CONSTRUCTION HAS BEEN A GREAT PROB AND CAUSED CONFUSION WITH THE LIGHTS AND CHANGES. RPTR SUGGESTION IS TO HAVE RED HOLD LIGHTS AT THE HOLD LINE AS LINE IS NOT VERY VISIBLE AT NIGHT. RPTR COMPANY IS HAVING THEIR SAFETY OFFICER FOLLOW UP WITH THE ARPT ON THE PROB.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.