OVERWT TKOF.
Synopsis
OVERWT TKOF.
Narrative
WHILE AIRPLANE WAS AT THE GATE; I DID INITIAL WALKAROUND AND THEN; AFTER A MAJORITY OF PAX WERE BOARDED; I DID A WALKAROUND TO DETERMINE IF DEICING WAS NECESSARY. I MADE THE DECISION TO DEICE AND TOLD THE COPLT TO CALL FOR WINGS AND STABILIZER TO BE DEICED. WHILE I WAS OUT; THE WT SHEET AND RWY ANALYSIS WAS BROUGHT TO THE COCKPIT. THE COPLT ENTERED THE DATA INTO THE FMC. I NEGLECTED TO SCRUTINIZE THE DATA WHICH INDICATED A BLEEDS OFF TKOF; ENG ANTI-ICE ON RWY 23. AFTER DEICE; WE TAXIED OUT DELAYING FLAP EXTENSION; THE RWY WAS CHANGED TO RWY 28 AND I CONCENTRATED ON TAXI OP AS THERE WERE PLOWS AND BANKS AS WELL AS DETERIORATING VISIBILITY. THE CRUX -- WE TOOK OFF OVERWT FOR THE RWY. FACTORS: OBVIOUSLY THE WX; COORD WITH GND; AND DEICE EQUIP. I SHOULD HAVE LOOKED AND ASKED TO SEE FINAL WT SHEET AND RWY ANALYSIS AND; WHEN THE RWY CHANGED; ASKED THE COPLT TO CHK. THANKS TO MR. BOEING; WE MADE IT IN SPITE OF OURSELVES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR FLIES THE B-737-300 AND -500 FOR A MAJOR UNITED STATES ACR ON THE DECLINE. HE ADMITS THAT NEITHER HE NOR HIS FO CHKED THE FINAL WT AND BAL FIGURES OR THEY WOULD HAVE NOTICED THAT THEY WERE GOING TO A WRONG RWY. THERE WERE NUMEROUS DISTRS; DEICING; RWY CHANGE WHILE TAXIING; ETC THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT. THE RPTR HAS CHANGED HIS PERSONAL PROCS TO CHK AND RECHK TO BE SURE THAT THEY HAVE NUMBERS FOR THE TKOF RWY. THE ACR'S PRELIMINARY FIGURES ARE FOR SEVERAL POSSIBLE RWYS; BUT THE FINAL FIGURES ARE FOR ONLY THE MOST PROBABLE RWY. RWY CHANGES WHILE TAXIING ARE NOT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT EXCEPT BY THE FLC ASKING FOR NEW NUMBERS.
More incidents for this aircraft family →
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.