ACR MECH RPTS THE POSSIBILITY OF A FAULTY LOCKING LUG FOR A FLAP XMISSION OUTPUT SHAFT DRIVE WAS PLACED INTO SVC BY MISTAKE.

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I WROTE A REQUEST FOR ENGINEERING DISPOSITION ON FLAP XMISSION OUTPUT SHAFT. THE MAX REWORK ON THE INSIDE DIAMETER IS .940; THE PART WAS MACHINED TO .9435. BOEING SCRAPPED THE PART SAYING UNACCEPTABLE FOR STRENGTH AS IS. PROB: BTWN THE MACHINE SHOP AND PLATING SHOP; THE ENGINEERING AUTHORIZATION PAPER WORK WAS SWITCHED. SO A SCRAPPED PART WAS PUT INTO SVC. THE PART WITH THE ENGINEERING AUTHORIZATION WAS IN DESIGN DIMENSIONS. I FOUND OUT ABOUT THIS PROB ON FEB/XX/95. TO MY KNOWLEDGE; MGMNT HAS DONE NOTHING TO LOCATE THIS SCRAPPED PART. HERE IS A COPY OF THE ENGINEERING AUTHORIZATION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THIS PART WAS FOR A B737 AND NOT SURE IF IT REALLY WENT INTO SVC OR NOT; BUT SUSPECTED THAT IT HAD SINCE THE PAPER WORK HAD BEEN INADVERTENTLY SWITCHED. HE FURTHER STATED THAT THERE IS NO REASON THAT THE COMPANY MAINT WOULD SWITCH PARTS ON PURPOSE SINCE THE PART IS PLENTIFUL AND THERE IS NO FAILURE RATE THAT WOULD CAUSE A HIGH USAGE RATE. HE BELIEVES THAT IF IT DID GO INTO SVC THAT IT WOULD NOT CAUSE A PROB SINCE IT WAS ONLY SLIGHTLY OVER LIMITS. HE STATED THAT THE PAPER WORK GOT MIXED UP FROM HIS SHOP TO THE PLATING SHOP. WHEN QUESTIONED FURTHER ABOUT THE ASSURANCE THAT THE PART IN QUESTION WAS ACCIDENTALLY PUT IN SVC; HE COULD NOT BE SURE THAT IT WAS NOT SCRAPPED AS REQUIRED OF AN OUT OF DIMENSIONAL PART. THEREFORE; HE IS NOT SURE OF THE PART'S FINAL RESTING PLACE BUT SUBMITTED THIS RPT FOR HIS OWN A&P CERTIFICATE PROTECTION.