XING RESTR NOT MET ON DSCNT.

Narrative

ZNY CLRED FLT TO CROSS A POINT 25 NM NE OF LANCASTER VOR AT FL200. FO SET THE XING POINT IN THE FMC AND SET THE ACFT UP TO AUTOMATICALLY DSND. FOR REASONS UNKNOWN; THE ACFT DID NOT DSND AS SCHEDULED. WHEN DISCOVERED THAT NOTHING HAD HAPPENED AT THE DSCNT POINT; A MANUAL DSCNT WITH SPD BRAKES WAS INITIATED BY THE FO. BOTH OF US THOUGHT THE XING POINT WOULD STILL BE MADE AT FL200. IN THE LAST 3000 FT OF THE DSCNT; THE HEADWINDS DECREASED EXTENDING THE DSCNT DISTANCE. THE RESULT WAS TO CROSS THE POINT AT FL210; 1000 FT HIGH. THE 767/757 COMPUTERS WORK SO WELL; COMPLACENCY SETS IN AND ONE HAS A TENDENCY TO SET UP A FLT PATH AND GO ON TO OTHER TASKS. IT IS OBVIOUS GLITCHES HAPPEN; EITHER IN THE PROGRAMMING OR IN THE COMPUTER ITSELF. IT IS CRITICAL THAT THE COMPUTER BE MONITORED AT ALL TIMES TO ENSURE PROPER OP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR FLIES THE B-767 ON EUROPEAN RTES AS A RESERVE CAPT. THE RPTR HAD NEVER SEEN THE FO THAT WAS FLYING BEFORE; AND THE RELIEF FO WAS OUT OF THE COCKPIT AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. THE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WAS 'MY FAULT;' THE CAPT BELIEVES THAT HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE AWARE. NEITHER CREWMAN WAS WATCHING CAREFULLY ENOUGH. THE CAPT BELIEVES THAT THE FMC WAS NOT PROPERLY PROGRAMMED. 'THERE IS ALWAYS ONE MORE BUTTON TO PUSH.' ARTCC DID NOT SEEM TO NOTICE THIS EPISODE. THE RPTR ADMITS THAT THIS IS NOTHING MORE THAN A 'CYA.'