POOR FLC PROCS; AND COM; LED TO AN ACR'S EXCEEDING 250 KIAS BELOW 10000 FT.

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LEVELED OFF AT 2000 FT; AND THE CAPT INCREASED AIRSPD TO 250 KIAS FROM 210 KIAS USED IN CLB; WITHOUT MY REQUEST. SOCAL APPARENTLY GAVE US A CLB TO 13000 FT; BUT I DID NOT HEAR IT; NOR DID I NOTICE THE CAPT CHANGE THE ALT ALERTER FROM 2000 FT TO 13000 FT. HE THEN SELECTED LEVEL CHANGE; WITHOUT MY ASKING FOR IT; WHICH COMMANDED CLB THRUST FROM THE ENGS. SINCE I WAS UNAWARE OF THE NEW ALT; I WAS MAINTAINING 2000 FT; AND THE AIRSPD INCREASED TO 285-295 KIAS BEFORE THE CAPT SAID ANYTHING ABOUT CLBING. THIS IS A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF A BREAKDOWN IN COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT; AND AGAINST OUR AIRLINES REQUIREMENT FOR THE PLT NOT SETTING THE ALT ALERTER; TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE ALT SET. THE PNF SHOULD NOT PUSH ANY BUTTONS ON THE AUTOFLT DIRECTOR SYS WITHOUT THE PF ASKING FOR IT. CAPTS AT MY AIRLINE; (ABOUT 50 PERCENT) THINK THAT IT IS OK FOR THEM TO DO THIS; BECAUSE THEY ARE THE CAPT. OUR AIRLINES POLICY REGARDING CHANGING THE ALT ALERTER IS EXCELLENT; AND WORKS VERY WELL; WHEN USED. IT SHOULD BE USED ALL OF THE TIME. IT INVOLVES BOTH PLTS BEING AWARE OF WHAT ALT THE ACFT IS GOING TO; AND IS AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT. WHEN IT BREAKS DOWN; LIKE IT DID IN THIS INSTANCE; A VIOLATION OF THE FARS OCCURS.