WDB AIR CREW TOOK OFF WITHOUT AIRWAY CLRNC.
Synopsis
WDB AIR CREW TOOK OFF WITHOUT AIRWAY CLRNC.
Narrative
IT WAS THE FIRST FLT OF THE FIRST LEG OF THE ID; ALL 3 OF US NEW TO EACH OTHER AND AFTER DAYS OFF FOR ALL OF US. WE TOOK OFF OF SFO WITHOUT A CLRNC -- WITHOUT RECEIVING OUR PDC WHICH WE DIDN'T' REALIZE UNTIL ATC ASKED US TO SQUAWK A DISCRETE CODE AFTER DEP. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE INCIDENT WERE SEVERAL DISTRS PRIOR TO PUSHBACK. THE CAPT'S FINAL FLT PRIOR TO RETIREMENT WITH HIS ENTIRE FAMILY ON BOARD; HIS SON (A COMMUTER PLT) IN THE COCKPIT; AN ACFT MODEL WE WERE NOT USED TO FLYING (A DC-10-30 AS OPPOSED TO A DC-10-10). THE RELEVANCE OF THE LAST POINT IS THAT THE ACARS (THROUGH WHICH THE PDC IS RECEIVED) IS POSITIONED DIFFERENTLY (BACK ON THE SO'S PANEL) AND OUT OF MY NORMAL COCKPIT SET-UP SCAN AND REACH. I GENERALLY CALL UP THE CLRNC PDC FROM THE R SEAT AS I PROCEED THROUGH MY COCKPIT SETUP. ALSO; I SPENT A FEW MINS STUDYING INS PROCS WITH 3 INS'S; SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT THAN 2 INS PROCS. THE CAPT HAD NOT FLOWN A DASH 30 IN OVER A YR; AND MYSELF IN SEVERAL MONTHS; THE SO ONLY A COUPLE OF TIMES OVER THE LAST YR. ULTIMATELY THOUGH; IT MAY HAVE BEEN THE SAMENESS OF THE SIT RATHER THAN DIFFERENCES WHICH CAUSED THIS BONE-HEADED EVENT. WE WERE ALL SO PLUGGED INTO THE ROUTINE OF ANOTHER HNL TRIP THAT WE MISSED THE FACT THAT A CLRNC WASN'T AROUND; EVEN THOUGH WE FOLLOWED ALL OTHER CHKLISTS AND SOP'S TO THE LETTER. AFTER REALIZING OUR ERROR; WE CALLED UP THE CLRNC IMMEDIATELY ON ACARS AND CONTINUED TO HNL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTING FO BELIEVES THAT THE PROB WITH THE PDC HINGED ON 2 POINTS: THEY WERE FLYING THE DC-10-30 VICE THE -10 AND THE CAPT WAS FLYING HIS LAST TRIP. THE CAPT MADE SEVERAL 'LITTLE BOO BOO'S' THAT THE FO BELIEVES WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED ON ANY OTHER TRIP OR IN THE -10. THE LAST FLT WAS 'A DISTR WE WERE ALL INTO' WITH WELL WISHERS IN THE COCKPIT DURING PREFLT. THE SO GOT THE CLRNC OUT OF ACARS SHORTLY AFTER TKOF AND THE RPTR BELIEVES THAT ATC WAS NOT AWARE OF THE OCCURRENCE. THE RPTR BELIEVES THAT THIS COULD BE PREVENTED BY CREWS BEING REQUIRED TO READBACK THEIR SQUAWK CODES AND INITIAL DEP FIX TO CLRNC DELIVERY OR GND CTL.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.