INST RATED PLT RIDING AS A PAX WITH A NON INST RATED PVT PLT FINDS HIMSELF TAKING OVER DUE TO BEING CAUGHT ON TOP WITHOUT FUEL TO GO TO DEST.

Date: 1995-04 · Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Anomalies: inflight-event-encounter-weather-turbulence|other-unspecified

Synopsis

INST RATED PLT RIDING AS A PAX WITH A NON INST RATED PVT PLT FINDS HIMSELF TAKING OVER DUE TO BEING CAUGHT ON TOP WITHOUT FUEL TO GO TO DEST.

Narrative

MY NON-INST RATED NEPHEW WAS GIVING ME A LIFT IN HIS ACFT TO A FIELD ABOUT 400 NM FROM OUR DEP POINT. HE HAS OVER 800 HRS; MOST IN TYPE; AND I LEFT THE FLYING TO HIM; AS I DID SOME READING AND DOZING. HE WAS PIC; I WAS THE PAX. I HAD NOT CHKED THE WX OR PARTICIPATED IN THE FLT PLANNING IN ANY WAY; NOR WAS I FAMILIAR WITH THE ACFT. HE SAID HE HAD CHKED THE WX AT AROUND XX00 AM (ABOUT 3 HRS PRIOR) AND MADE THE GO DECISION. WE DEPARTED IN GOOD VFR CONDITIONS; AND AFTER AN HR OR SO; WERE CRUISING AT 4500 FT WELL ABOVE A SCATTERED BROKEN LAYER. I ASKED MY NEPHEW BRIEFLY ABOUT THE FORECAST CONDITIONS AT OUR DEST; AND HE TOLD ME THAT THE CLOUD COVER BELOW US WAS DUE TO LAKE EFFECT AND THAT CONDITIONS WERE EXPECTED TO BE IMPROVING TOWARDS OUR DEST; WHICH WAS ON THE WINDWARD SIDE OF LAKE ONTARIO. I BECAME MUCH MORE 'INTERESTED' IN OUR SIT AS THE TOPS OF THE UNDERCAST RAISED; THE SCATTERED BROKEN LAYER BECAME OVCST WITH NO BREAKS; AND HE STARTED TALKING ABOUT GETTING LOW ON FUEL. (I WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH ENDURANCE FIGURES FOR THE ACFT). OUR GNDSPD WAS POOR ; AND I HAD DOUBTS ABOUT OUR ABILITY TO REACH HIS EARLIER- STATED FUEL STOP WITH SUFFICIENT RESERVES; SINCE IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT WE MIGHT HAVE TO GO IFR SHORTLY; PRESUMABLY WITH ME AS PIC. RATHER THAN TRYING TO STRETCH IT; I SUGGESTED STOPPING AT A FIELD RELATIVELY CLOSE BY ALONG ON OUR PRESENT RTE; AND HE AGREED. I ASKED ATC IF WE COULD GET IFR WITH THEM; AND THEY COMPLIED SHORTLY THEREAFTER. I TOOK OUT MY APCH PLATES AND IFR CHARTS AND TOOK OVER; ANTICIPATING (WITH LITTLE BASIS) A ROUTINE INST APCH TO MVFR CONDITIONS BENEATH THE UNDERCAST. WHEN THE CTLR RPTED 500 FT OVCST (AT A FIELD ABOUT 40 MI E; NO WX RPTING AT THE FIELD WE WERE GOING INTO) I BEGAN TO HAVE DOUBTS. WE SHOT A VOR APCH TO A 657 FT MDA; PICKED UP SOME ICE ON THE WAY DOWN; DIDN'T BREAK OUT; THEN SHOT THE LOC TO A 402 FT MDA; PICKED UP A BIT MORE ICE; AND STILL DIDN'T BREAK OUT. BY THEN; OUR FUEL SIT WAS VERY UNCOMFORTABLE; AND WE DIVERTED TO A FIELD ABOUT 45 MI AWAY WITH AN ILS TO 200 FT; SHOT THE APCH AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. WE HAD ACCUMULATED ABOUT 1/2-3/4 INCHES OF RIME AND THE CFR TRUCKS WERE OUT TO GREET US; SINCE I HAD DECLARED MINIMUM FUEL ON THE WAY IN. BASED ON THE FUEL REQUIRED TO TOP OFF; MY NEPHEW RPTED THAT WE HAD LESS THAN 6 GALS USABLE WHEN WE LANDED. THERE SEEM TO BE 2 MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS SIT. 1ST; ON MY NEPHEW'S PART; I'M SORRY TO SAY; POOR PREFLT PLANNING; INADEQUATE UNDERSTANDING OF WX INFO; FAILURE TO UPDATE WX INFO ENRTE. DESPITE MY NEPHEW'S CLAIMS THAT THE WX WAS UNFORECAST; I WAS LATER ABLE TO DETERMINE FROM OLD FORECASTS AND WX INFO THAT THE WX WE ENCOUNTERED WAS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY WORSE THAN FORECAST; WAS NOT DUE TO LAKE EFFECT (IT WAS DUE TO A LARGE QUASI- STATIONARY FRONT ACROSS OUR PATH) THAT ICING CONDITIONS WERE BOTH FORECAST AND RPTED; AND THAT IT WAS VERY UNLIKELY FROM THE WX INFO THAT WAS AVAILABLE - EVEN BEFORE WE DEPARTED - THAT A VFR FLT COULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED ALL THE WAY TO OUR DEST THAT DAY; REGARDLESS OF FUEL. WHILE WE WERE ON THE GND; I MADE A POINT OF ASKING MY NEPHEW (WHO HAS BEEN WORKING TOWARDS HIS INST RATING FOR QUITE A FEW YRS) SOME POINTED QUESTIONS ABOUT AIRMETS AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE WX BRIEFING PROCESS AS WE LOOKED AT THE PRINTOUTS FROM DUATS. TO MY CHAGRIN; HIS KNOWLEDGE WAS LACKING IN SOME FUNDAMENTAL AREAS. ON MY PART; I CLRLY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN COMPLACENT ABOUT THE FLT ONCE THE UNDERCAST STARTED TO DEVELOP; AND SHOULD HAVE SUGGESTED THAT WE BEGIN CONSIDERING OUR OPTIONS EARLIER ON; INSTEAD OF WAITING FOR HIM TO DECIDE. THERE WAS ALSO PROBABLY AN ELEMENT OF THE CLASSIC 'WHO IS PIC?' CONFUSION AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR; SINCE MY NEPHEW ASSUMED THAT IF WE COULDN'T MAINTAIN VFR; THAT I WOULD JUST TAKE OVER AND EVERYTHING WOULD BE OK. EVEN THOUGH I WAS NOT AT ALL PREPARED TO BECOME PIC ON THAT FLT; ONCE IT BECAME LIKELY THAT I WOULD HAVE TO; I SHOULD HAVE FAMILIARIZED MYSELF MORE COMPLETELY WITH THE WX AND ALTERNATE SIT. INRETROSPECT; IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH BETTER TO HAVE DIVERTED TO THE ILS FIELD AFTER OUR FIRST VOR APCH; INSTEAD OF GOING BACK FOR THE LOC. HAVING A CLR UNDERSTANDING OF HOW THE FLT WAS GOING TO BE CONDUCTED AND WHO WAS PIC WOULD HAVE PROBABLY AVOIDED THE SIT. IF WE WERE CLR THAT HE WAS PIC; THEN (ONE CAN HOPE) HE WOULD HAVE TURNED BACK FAIRLY EARLY ON IN THE FLT INSTEAD OF CONTINUING ABOVE THE UNDERCAST; BURNING FUEL AND REDUCING OUR OPTIONS; AND WITH THE UNWARRANTED ASSUMPTION THAT I WOULD TAKE OVER IF WE COULDN'T MAINTAIN VFR. ALTHOUGH I WAS ANGRY ABOUT BEING FLOWN INTO A BAD SIT AND THEN RELIED UPON TO EXTRICATE US FROM IT; IT IS LIKELY THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BEFOREHAND BY CLARIFYING WHO WAS PIC.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.