AFTER A FLT SEGMENT WAS COMPLETED; AN FAA INSPECTOR PAX IDENTED SELF; AND QUESTIONED THE FLT ATTENDANT REGARDING STOWAGE OF A PAX'S BAG. THE INSPECTOR ASSERTED THAT THE BAG HAD NOT BEEN STOWED PROPERLY AND THAT THIS WAS A VIOLATION OF FARS.
Synopsis
AFTER A FLT SEGMENT WAS COMPLETED; AN FAA INSPECTOR PAX IDENTED SELF; AND QUESTIONED THE FLT ATTENDANT REGARDING STOWAGE OF A PAX'S BAG. THE INSPECTOR ASSERTED THAT THE BAG HAD NOT BEEN STOWED PROPERLY AND THAT THIS WAS A VIOLATION OF FARS.
Narrative
FLT XXX (DHN-ATL) EMB-120; 28 PAX. PAX IN SEAT XX (EXIT ROW ON EMB-120) HAD A LARGE DUFFEL BAG. I ATTEMPTED TO GATE CHK THE BAG. THE PAX WANTED TO KEEP THE BAG. I SPOKE TO THE PAX TWICE AND TOLD HIM TO PUT THE BAG UNDER THE SEAT AS FAR AS IT WOULD GO. I TOLD HIM TO PUSH IT WITH HIS FEET. I PULLED IT ALL THE WAY FORWARD TO THE BAR BENEATH THE SEAT IN FRONT. THE BAG WAS SECURED. IT WAS PROTRUDING APPROX 6 INCHES. AS THE FLT ATTENDANT; I DID NOT FEEL THIS WAS AN OBSTRUCTION (THE EXIT ROW) COMPROMISING THE SAFETY OF THE PAX. THE MAN STILL HAD AMPLE ROOM FOR HIS FEET. I MADE ALL REQUIRED ANNOUNCEMENTS. UPON DEPLANING; PAX IN SEAT XX ASKED WHY I ALLOWED THE ROW TO BE BLOCKED. NOT KNOWING AT THIS TIME WHO HE WAS; I EXPLAINED THE BAG WAS SECURELY STOWED. PAX IN SEAT XX SAID THE BAG WAS TOO LARGE AND HE THOUGHT IT WAS A VIOLATION OF THE FARS. PAX IN SEAT XX THEN STATED HE WAS AN FAA INSPECTOR; ONLY UPON LEAVING THE ACFT. THE PROB AROSE BY TRYING TO COMBINE SAFETY AND SVC AND COMPLYING WITH BOTH. ALSO; THERE WAS A MAX OF PAX AND BAGS BECAUSE OF THE WX AND '0' FUEL WT OF THE ACFT AND WE WERE TRYING TO ACCOMMODATE ALL CONCERNED. FURTHERMORE; PAX SHOULD BE MORE AWARE OF EXACTLY WHY FLT ATTENDANTS ARE ON THE AIRPLANE. THE PROB DID NOT ARISE UNTIL THE END OF THE FLT WHEN THE PAX IN SEAT XX STATED HE THOUGHT THIS WAS AN OBSTRUCTION. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION; IF ANY WAS NEEDED; WAS NOT MENTIONED UNTIL THE END OF THE FLT. PERCEPTION AND JUDGEMENT FACTORS WERE BOTH INVOLVED BECAUSE IT IS ONE PERSON'S PERCEPTION OF WHAT IS TOO BIG AND IF THE AISLE IS STILL PASSABLE. EMB-120 HAS 1 FLT ATTENDANT TO MAKE THE DECISIONS IN THE CABIN. THAT 1 FLT ATTENDANT HAS TO BE 'PERFECT' AT ALL TIMES WITH NO ONE ELSE TO ASSIST HIM/HER. ALSO; IT WAS THE LAST FLT OF 8 FLTS IN A 22 HR PERIOD WITH 8 HRS ON THE GND. THE LACK OF REST CONTRIBUTED TO THE ALERTNESS OF THAT 1 CREW MEMBER AND HIS/HER JUDGEMENTS. IF THIS WAS TRULY A COMPROMISE OF SAFETY; IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO MY ATTN BEFORE THE PLANE LEFT THE GATE IN DOTHAN. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: FLT ATTENDANT STATES THAT THERE IS A LOT OF PRESSURE FROM THE COMPANY TO 'JUST DO YOUR JOB; BUT NO SUBSTANTIAL TRAINING; AND NO BACKING;' TO PROMOTE JOB PERFORMANCE. THEN; 'IT SEEMS THAT ALL THE PAX THINKS THAT YOU ARE THERE FOR IS PRETZELS AND PEANUTS.' RPTR WAS REMINDED THAT THE FLT ATTENDANT POS IS REQUIRED BY FARS; AND THE JOB'S PRIMARY FOCUS SHOULD BE SAFETY. FLT ATTENDANT STATED THAT THIS IS NOT THE COMPANY'S REPRESENTATION OF THE JOB DESCRIPTION; BUT THAT OTHERS HAVE CONVEYED THIS ATTITUDE. RPTR AGREED THAT ONE CAN ASSERT HIS/HER POS IN A MANNER THAT WOULD STILL MEET WITH THE COMPANY'S SVC ORIENTATION. RPTR'S CALL TO DOTHAN REVEALED THAT THE INSPECTOR WAS TRAVELING ON BUSINESS UNRELATED TO THIS COMPANY'S OP; AND THAT FAA PERSON WAS NOT AN ACI FOR THIS ACR.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.