FAR -- NON PRECISION APCH PROC -- ACR MAKES A VISUAL APCH IN LESS THAN VISUAL WX CONDITIONS.
Synopsis
FAR -- NON PRECISION APCH PROC -- ACR MAKES A VISUAL APCH IN LESS THAN VISUAL WX CONDITIONS.
Narrative
WX (RAIN SHOWER) IN CLT AREA. ON ATIS; RWY IN USE WAS GIVEN AS RWY 18R. WHILE BEING VECTORED BY APCH; ADVISED TO EXPECT RWY 23. AT FINAL APCH FIX; TWR ADVISED OF GUSTY WIND CONDITIONS AND WE ABANDONED THE APCH. WE WERE GIVEN A HDG OF 180 DEGS AND ALT OF 2700 FT. APCH SAID TO EXPECT ILS TO RWY 36R. A COUPLE OF MINS LATER; APCH SAID TO EXPECT ILS TO RWY 36L. AFTER WE WERE ON BASE SE OF THE ARPT; PROBABLY ABOUT 7-8 MI OUT; THE CTLR SAID TO EXPECT ASR AND HE WOULD BE TURNING US ON IN A SHORT TIME. I COULD ALMOST MAKE OUT THE ARPT; BUT TOLD THE FO; THAT WE COULD DO A VISUAL IF HE COULD TURN US TOWARD THE ARPT; WHICH HE DID. THERE WAS ALSO A QUESTION IN MY MIND ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT WE COULD LEGALLY DO THE APCH SINCE THE ASR PLATES HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM OUR MANUALS; SO I VERBALIZED TO THE FO THAT WE WOULD NEED TO SEE THE ARPT; SO WE COULD REQUEST A VISUAL APCH. I BELIEVED THEN AND NOW; THAT IN ORDER TO DO AN ASR (WHICH WE ARE AUTH TO DO IN OPS SPECS); YOU WOULD HAVE TO HAVE VFR MINIMUMS (1000-3000 FT) TO CONTINUE THE APCH. BTWN US AND THE ARPT; WE HAD MORE THAN THAT. FOR A BACKUP; I HAD THE ILS RWY 36L TUNED. WE COULD SEE A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE RWY WHEN WE TURNED TOWARD THE ARPT AT 5.5 MI. THE REST OF THE RWY WAS IN THE RAIN SHOWER. THE CTLR SAID WE COULD BEGIN DSCNT AND TO CALL THE TWR WHICH WE DID. WE ASKED FOR THE WIND AND WAS GIVEN 310 DEGS 20 KTS. NO MENTION WAS EVER MADE ABOUT WINDSHEAR OR WHAT THE PREVAILING VISIBILITY OR CEILING WAS. ON ABOUT A 1 MI FINAL; THE TWR SAID THERE WAS HVY RAIN AT THE ARPT; BUT WE COULD STILL SEE WHAT I ESTIMATED TO BE 1/3 OF THE RWY. ONCE OVER THE RWY; WE DID INDEED ENCOUNTER MODERATE TO HVY RAIN AND A SMALL GUST THAT CAUSED ME TO LAND LONGER THAN I INTENDED. WE TURNED ON THE WIPERS AND USED RAIN REPELLENT TO IMPROVE OUR VISIBILITY. WE TURNED OFF AT THE LAST HIGH SPD OF RWY 36L WITH NORMAL BRAKING. IN RETROSPECT; I AM NOT SURE ABOUT THE LEGALITY OF THE APCH CLRNC (ASR). WE WERE NEVER GIVEN ANY UPDATED CEILING AND VISIBILITY INFO TO MY KNOWLEDGE. THE WX WHERE WE WERE WAS DEFINITELY VFR; BUT BASED ON OUR OTHER OBSERVATIONS IN RETROSPECT; THE TWR WAS PROBABLY NOT RPTING VFR SINCE WE COULDN'T SEE IT. ANOTHER CONCERN IN RETROSPECT WAS MY DECISION TO CONTINUE WHEN WE HEARD THE HVY RAIN ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE TWR. THE FO EVEN VERBALIZED HIS CONCERN. IN OUR LATER DISCUSSION ON THE GND; WE BELIEVE COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT FAILED; BECAUSE HE DIDN'T GET A RESOLUTION TO HIS BEING UNCOMFORTABLE. OTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WAS THE MULTIPLE EXPECT APCHS (TOTAL OF 5 -- ILS RWY 18R; BC RWY 23; ILS RWY 36R; ILS RWY 36L; ASR RWY 36L); ABANDONMENT OF THE BC RWY 23 BECAUSE OF GUSTY WIND; LATENESS OF FLT BECAUSE OF MECHANICAL DELAY; SHORT OVERNIGHT; LAST LEG OF THE DAY AND TRIP.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.