A DC9-30 FLC EXPERIENCED A #2 HYD SYS FAILURE. CABIN CREWMEMBERS AND PAX WERE ADVISED.

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APPROX 20 MINS AFTER DEPARTING BHM; CHK AIRMAN; IN JUMPSEAT; NOTICED LOSS OF #2 HYD FLUID. WE WERE IN CRUISE PHASE WITH LITTLE OR NO HYD DEMAND. WE; INCLUDING JUMP SEAT RIDER; REVIEWED AND FOLLOWED APPROPRIATE PROCS. CABIN CREW AND PAX WERE ADVISED. AS WE WERE COMPLETING THE ABNORMAL CHKLIST; ATL ATC ISSUED US HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLT; OUR DEST. I ADVISED ATC I DID NOT WISH TO HOLD BECAUSE OF THE HYD PROB -- THEY COMPLIED AND VECTORED US TOWARDS CLT. NO EMER WAS DECLARED. THE LNDG GEAR WAS LOWERED VIA THE #1 HYD SYS. 15 MI FROM TOUCHDOWN; ALL NORMAL INDICATIONS WERE PRESENT. THE PAX AND CABIN CREW WERE THEN TOLD WE WOULD HAVE A NORMAL LNDG; AS WAS CLT APCH AND TWR. I DID NOT REQUEST ANY GND EQUIP; YET THEY FOLLOWED US UPON TOUCHDOWN. APCH AND LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. AFTER TAXING TO THE GATE; ARPT POLICE WERE TOLD 'WE HAD LOST ALL OF OUR HYD SYS.' CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE DC9-30 HYD SYS INCORPORATES PROTECTION TO PREVENT COMPONENT DAMAGE. A HYD FUSE WILL BLOW OUT IF THE SYS EXPERIENCES A SUDDEN RUSH (VOLUME) OF FLUID. RPTR STATES THAT FLC AND CHK AIRMAN REASONABLY DETERMINED THE CRITICALITY OF THE PROB; HOWEVER; ATC AND ARPT CFR RESPONSE WAS CONSERVATIVE -- RPTR RECOGNIZES THAT PERCEPTIONS ARE VARIABLE AND BELIEVES IT IS CORRECT TO ACT ON THE SAFE SIDE; ON ATC'S PART.