FLC DEVIATES FROM ASSIGNED DEP ROUTING.

Narrative

ON AUG/XX/95; I DEPARTED THE KAPALUA-W MAUI ARPT ON FLT AS THE FO. I WAS THE PNF ON AN INST DEP ENRTE TO HONOLULU. THE TKOF BRIEFING BY THE CAPT CONSISTED OF A REVIEW OF THE CLRNC I HAD JUST RECEIVED: HNL; AS FILED; CHAIN INTXN; JULLE 4 ARR; 8000 FT. WE DISCUSSED THE INITIAL CLBOUT FROM KAPALUA; AND BOTH AGREED ON THE RECOMMENDED INITIAL DEP PROC OF RWY HDG; AND 1500 FT OR ABOVE ACROSS THE SHORELINE. THE CAPT THEN SET BOTH NAVAIDS AND INFORMED ME DURING THIS TKOF BRIEF OF HIS PLAN TO DEPART THE ARPT AS DISCUSSED; AND THEN EXECUTE THE PRESCRIBED IFR DEP PROC FOR KAPALUA. AFTER CLBING THROUGH 1500 FT AND XING THE SHORELINE; WE PROCEEDED ON THE PRESCRIBED HDG OF 220 DEGS; UP TO 8000 FT. ONCE ESTABLISHED ON THE INITIAL HDG THE CAPT REVIEWED HIS INTENTIONS ALOUD SAYING 'OK; 220 DEG HDG TO INTERCEPT THE 25 DME OUT OF MOLOKAI.' AFTER CLBING PAST 2000 FT I CONTACTED ZHN; BUT WAS ONLY GIVEN AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND NOT TOLD 'RADAR CONTACT.' SHORTLY AFTER; THE CAPT SAID 'THERE'S THE 25 OUT OF MKK;' AND PROCEEDED TO TURN TO INTERCEPT. I DID NOT HAVE THE JULLE 4 ARR OUT AND IN VIEW AT THAT TIME. I ONLY HAD THE VOR DME-A APCH PLATE FOR KAPALUA IN SIGHT (THE PLATE DEPICTS BOTH THE MOLOKAI VOR AND CHAIN INTXN). MY VOR WAS TUNED TO LANAI; HIS TO MOLOKAI. AS WE CONTINUED ON WHAT I BELIEVED TO BE THE 25 DME ARC THE CAPT BEGAN REVIEWING THE DEP PROCS ALOUD TO RECONFIRM HIS ACTIONS. AS HE READ WE WERE CALLED BY CTR ASKING IF WE HAD PASSED CHAIN. I BELIEVE THE CAPT ANSWERED YES; AND BEGAN A TURN TO THE L; FURTHER S. WE WERE STILL NOT IN RADAR CONTACT WHEN CTR CALLED US ASKING US TO CONFIRM OUR ALT OF 8000 FT. I REPLIED YES; AND GOT A QUICK CUT OFF OF THE LNY VOR TO SEE EXACTLY WHERE WE WERE. I POINTED TO MY APCH PLATE AND SAID TO THE CAPT 'WE'RE OVER HERE; SE OF LNY.' I THEN CALLED CTR ASKING FOR VECTORS TO INTERCEPT THE JULLE 4 ARR. CTR DID NOT GIVE US VECTORS AT THAT TIME; AND ONCE AGAIN ASKED US TO CONFIRM OUR ALT. AFTER CONFIRMING 8000 FT BOTH THE CAPT AND I AGREED WE WERE WELL S OF COURSE; AND WE TURNED N IMMEDIATELY TO RECTIFY. ATC THEN ASKED IF WE SHOWED OURSELVES S OF LANAI. I REPLIED YES. WE FLEW THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WITHOUT INCIDENT. FACTORS WHICH I BELIEVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OCCURRENCE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: THE CAPT'S UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE KAPALUA IFR DEP PROCS; AND HIS MISINTERP OF THE NAVAIDS USED. THE COMPANY HAD ONLY BEGUN FLTS TO KAPALUA MONTHS BEFORE; AND THE CAPT HAD BEEN UPGRADED ONLY WKS BEFORE. MY INEXPERIENCE FLYING IN THE LCL AREA. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE SITUATIONALLY AWARE; AND SHOULD HAVE MORE THOROUGHLY REVIEWED OUR PLAN OF FLT AS WELL. (IT WASN'T UNTIL AFTER WE DEPARTED KAPALUA AND HAD BEGUN OUR TURN TO 220 DEGS THAT I SAW WE WERE FOLLOWING THE PRESCRIBED CLBING L TURN AFTER 1200 FT INSTEAD OF THE 1500 FT OVER THE SHORELINE.) STEPS THAT I BELIEVE COULD AID IN POSSIBLY PREVENTING OTHER SUCH OCCURRENCES ARE: NON-SCHEDULING OF RELATIVELY NEW FO WITH NEW CAPT. (A POLICY WHICH IS CURRENTLY BEING IMPLEMENTED BY OUR CHIEF PLT.) AN AREA FAMILIARIZATION CLASS INCORPORATED INTO INDOCTRINATION FOR THOSE PLTS NEW TO THE AREA.