PROP STRIKE ON RWY AFTER A HIGH SPD VISUAL APCH TO DCA AND FAILING TO LOWER LNDG GEAR.

Date: 1995-09 · Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Anomalies: deviation-discrepancy-procedural-other-unknown|other-unspecified

Synopsis

PROP STRIKE ON RWY AFTER A HIGH SPD VISUAL APCH TO DCA AND FAILING TO LOWER LNDG GEAR.

Narrative

AT THE END OF A FLT FROM BED TO DCA THE PLT WAS VECTORED TO A LNDG AT RWY 21 (4505 FT) AT XA30Z (ALMOST FULLY DARK). THE FLT WAS ON AN IFR FLT PLAN. ATIS YANKEE WAS CURRENT AND STATED WINDS 180 DEGS AT 13 KTS USING THE RIVER VISUAL APCH TO RWY 18 WITH LNDGS AND TKOFS ON INTERSECTING RWYS. ANDREWS APCH CLRED 'DIRECT TO THE ARPT;' AND THEN FOR THE 'VISUAL APCH TO RWY 21' AND HANDED OFF TO THE DCA TWR. THE TWR URGED THE PLT TO 'KEEP SPD UP AND FLY DIRECT TO THE NUMBERS;' THIS WAS DONE. LNDG CHKLIST AND SIGNIFICANT PWR REDUCTION DONE; BUT GEAR AND FLAPS DEPLOYMENT WAS DELAYED TO ACCOMPLISH A RAPID APCH. THE APCH TERMINATED IN A TIGHT TURN TO THE END OF RWY 21 WHILE STILL CARRYING QUITE A BIT OF AIRSPD. THE PLT'S ATTN WAS FOCUSED ON INSURING AN ADEQUATELY EARLY TOUCHDOWN; NO CONFLICT FROM LNDG TFC ON RWY 18; ACCEPTANCE BY OTHER ACFT OF THE 'HOLD SHORT RWY 21 FOR LNDG RWY 18 TFC;' AND THE VISUAL ENVIRONMENT OUTSIDE OF THE ACFT. FLAPS WERE DEPLOYED TO ADD DRAG; BUT A GUMPS CHK WAS NOT DONE COMING 'OVER THE FENCE' AND THE LACK OF A MORE RAPID DSCNT WAS NOT IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZED BY THE PLT. THE PLANE WAS ALIGNED WITH THE RWY FLYING LEVEL TO SLIGHTLY NOSE DOWN AT ABOUT 85 KTS WHEN THE PROP STRIKE WAS DETECTED (BTWN 1000 FT AND 2000 FT DOWN RWY 21). THE PLT IMMEDIATELY RAISED THE NOSE; GAINED 25 FT OF ALT AND SIMULTANEOUSLY DROPPED THE GEAR; GOT 3 GREEN LIGHTS AND THEN PROCEEDED TO LAND NORMALLY; MAIN GEAR GND CONTACT WAS HARD ENOUGH TO INDUCE A BOUNCE THAT WAS EASILY OVERCOME WELL BEFORE THE RWY END. THE ENG SEEMED TO BE OPERATING NORMALLY AND THE PLT PROCEEDED TO TAXI TO THE GA AREA AND PARKED THE PLANE NORMALLY. A CURSORY INSPECTION REVEALED THERE HAD BEEN A PROP STRIKE AND SHOWED NO OTHER VISIBLE DAMAGE. THERE WAS NO INJURY OF ANY KIND TO THE PLT OR PAX. THE NEXT DAY A MORE THOROUGH EXAMINATION OF THE PLANE SHOWED NO VISIBLE DAMAGE TO THE PLANE AND NO GND CONTACT BY THE PLANE (EXCEPT FOR THE PROP TIPS). THIS PLANE IS EQUIPPED WITH THE AUTOMATIC LNDG GEAR DEPLOYMENT SYS. THE PLT BELIEVES THE AUTOMATIC DEPLOYMENT OF THE GEAR DID NOT HAPPEN IN TIME TO PREVENT THE PROP STRIKE BECAUSE OF THE SPD. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE ULTIMATE RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF THE GEAR WAS IN PART DUE TO THE AUTOMATIC SYS. THE PLT DID NOT RECALL ANY GEAR WARNING SIGNAL. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE SPD AND THE LACK OF DEPLOYMENT BY THE AUTOMATIC SYS. THE PLT HAD EXPERIENCED THE AUTOMATED DEPLOYMENT SYS WORK PROPERLY 30 DAYS BEFORE DURING A PRACTICE EXERCISE DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE THE FUNCTION. THE GND CTLR DID REMARK 'THAT WAS A NICE SAVE.' THERE ARE NO EXCUSES FOR THIS SORT OF HAPPENING. HAVING SAID THAT: THIS PLT'S PAST EXPERIENCE AND DISCIPLINE ABOUT LNDG CHKS IS MOSTLY IN NORMAL PATTERNS AND AT SOMEWHAT LESS BUSY ARPTS. THE TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE DID NOT OVERCOME THE PLT'S TENDENCY TO NARROW HIS FOCUS AND PERHAPS BE OVERLY RESPONSIVE TO CTLR REQUESTS. WHILE 3 1/2 HRS IS A MODESTLY LONG FLT; THE PLT WAS RESTED; AND THE FLT CONDITIONS WERE UNCOMPLICATED AND THE AIR WAS SMOOTH AND MOSTLY CLR. THE PLT HAS FLOWN INTO DCA ON 4 OTHER OCCASIONS; INCLUDING ONE SIMILAR APCH TO RWY 21; SO HE WAS NOT COMPLETELY INEXPERIENCED WITH THIS ARPT. HIS EXPERIENCE AT OTHER SIMILAR HIGH VOLUME JET ARPTS IS LIMITED TO ONE OR TWO LNDGS AND TKOFS. THE OVER FOCUS ON TWR REQUESTS IS CONSISTENT WITH SUCH A LACK OF EXPERIENCE. THE PLT HAD OWNED AN ACFT OF THE SAME TYPE BUT WITH SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT ELECTRONICS. HE HAD FLOWN THIS SPECIFIC ACFT 4 TIMES AND 7 HRS PRIOR TO THIS FLT. WHILE THE DIFFERENT ELECTRONICS PRESENTED SOME DISTRACTIONS IN EARLIER PHASES OF THE FLT; THE PLT DOES NOT BELIEVE THEY WERE ANY FACTOR IN THIS HAPPENING. THE PLT NEEDS TO UNDERSTAND IF 'OVER FOCUSING' IS SUFFICIENTLY INHERENT TO STOP FLYING; AND IF NOT; TO GET ADDITIONAL SPECIFIC TRAINING TO INSTILL A BETTER SET OF PROCS.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.