THE FLC EXPERIENCED LOW OIL PRESSURE INDICATIONS ON THE GAUGE AND CORRESPONDING WARNING LIGHT. THE ENG AS PER PROCEDURE WAS SHUT DOWN. THE WX AT DEP POINT WAS 800 FT OVCST AND SNOW AND THE DEST WAS CLR AND WINDS WERE DOWN THE RWY. THE CLOSER ARPTS HAD WX PROBS. THE CAPT DECLARED AN EMER AND CONTINUED TO DEST. THE FO THOUGHT THE CAPT SHOULD HAVE GONE TO THE DEP ARPT BECAUSE IT WAS CLOSER AND FLOWN THE INST APCH.
Synopsis
THE FLC EXPERIENCED LOW OIL PRESSURE INDICATIONS ON THE GAUGE AND CORRESPONDING WARNING LIGHT. THE ENG AS PER PROCEDURE WAS SHUT DOWN. THE WX AT DEP POINT WAS 800 FT OVCST AND SNOW AND THE DEST WAS CLR AND WINDS WERE DOWN THE RWY. THE CLOSER ARPTS HAD WX PROBS. THE CAPT DECLARED AN EMER AND CONTINUED TO DEST. THE FO THOUGHT THE CAPT SHOULD HAVE GONE TO THE DEP ARPT BECAUSE IT WAS CLOSER AND FLOWN THE INST APCH.
Narrative
THE BAE JETSTREAM 41'S L ENG WOULD NOT START IN BIRMINGHAM; AL. MAINT CHANGED THE STARTER/GENERATOR AND WE DEPARTED BHM AT XA13 CST; FOR STL. APPROX 90 NM NW OF VULCAN VOR OUR L OIL PRESSURE INDICATOR BEGAN TO FLUCTUATE AND IN ABOUT 5 MINS LATER THE LOW OIL PRESSURE LIGHT CAME ON. WE EXECUTED THE PRECAUTIONARY ENG SHUTDOWN PER THE CHKLIST AND DECLARED AN EMER WITH ZME. THE DISCUSSION NOW CTRED ON WHERE THE CLOSEST SUITABLE ALTERNATE WAS. AFTER I HAD SUGGESTED RETURNING TO BHM THE PIC STATED HE DID NOT WANT TO SHOOT A SINGLE ENG IFR APCH. CAPE GIRARDEAU HAD STRONG XWINDS AND SNOW AND ICE ON THE RWY AND WAS DEEMED BY THE PIC AS NOT SUITABLE. STL WX WAS CLR WITH WINDS DOWN THE RWY AT 10 KTS AND GOOD BRAKING ACTION. THE PIC'S DECISION WAS TO CONTINUE ON TO OUR DEST (STL) BECAUSE OF THE FAVORABLE WX AND RWY CONDITIONS. WITH PREVAILING HEADWINDS THE FLT AT 12000 FT MSL TO STL TOOK APPROX 1 HR 45 MINS ON 1 ENG. I BELIEVE THE PIC SHOULD HAVE NOT ELIMINATED BHM AS THE BEST ALTERNATIVE. SHOOTING AN IFR APCH AND LNDG IN LIGHT SNOW (GOOD BRAKING) WITH A XWIND AT BHM WOULD HAVE HAD US BACK ON THE GND MUCH SOONER. PERHAPS A BETTER DEFINITION OF WHAT IS OR IS NOT A SUITABLE ALTERNATE WOULD HAVE HELPED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE PROB WITH THE ENG WAS A SMALL OIL LINE ASSOCIATED WITH THE STARTER/GENERATOR APPARENTLY NOT CONNECTED SECURELY. THE RPTR WAS ASKED IF HE STILL FELT THE CAPT SHOULD HAVE RETURNED TO HIS DEP POINT BECAUSE IT WAS CLOSER. THE RPTR SAID HE DID. HE DID NOT FEEL GOING INTO THE WX WAS A PROB AND FLYING THAT LONG ON 1 ENG WAS. THE RPTR WAS ASKED IF HE HAD EXPERIENCED PROBS WITH THOSE ENGS. HE STATED HE HAD ABOUT 700 HRS AND HAD TO MAKE A PRECAUTIONARY ENG SHUTDOWN WHEN ANOTHER OIL LINE TO AN ENG OIL COOLER CAME LOOSE. THE RPTR WAS ASKED IF THE FAA HAD CONTESTED THE CAPT'S DECISION AND HE SAID NO. THE RPTR WAS ASKED IF THE WX WERE GOOD AROUND NASHVILLE. HE SAID THE WX WAS BAD S AND E OF STL. THE WX HAD BEEN IN THE STL AREA AND MOVED ON S AND E. THE WX WAS FAIRLY CLR AT CAPE GIRARDEAU BUT THERE WAS SNOW ON THE RWYS AND STRONG XWINDS. THE RPTR WAS ASKED IF THE WX IN BHM WAS IMPROVING. HE SAID NO; THE WX WAS JUST MOVING IN WHEN THEY LEFT AND CONDITIONS WERE DETERIORATING. THE RPTR STILL FELT AN OVERRIDING NEED TO LAND AT THE CLOSEST ARPT WHICH WAS BHM ABOUT 100 MI BACK.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.