DUE TO NUMEROUS CONTRIBUTING FACTORS ACFT WAS TAXIED TOO CLOSE TO ACTIVE RWY AND ACFT ON FINAL APCH DID A GAR.

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TOLD TO TAXI TO RWY 28 VIA N RAMP AND TO HOLD SHORT OF TXWY A4. RAMP WAS COVERED WITH SNOW (PLOWED BUT HARDPACKED) WHICH OBSCURED NORMAL TXWY LINES. DIRECTED BY GND TO GET TO TXWY A4 BY TAXIING AROUND 5 OR 6 SNOW REMOVAL VEHICLES THAT WERE IN MY WAY AT RAMP AND BEGINNING OF TXWY A4. TOLD TO TAXI BY GND TO RWY 28 VIA TXWY A4 AND TXWY A AND CONTACT TWR. I TAXIED ONTO TXWY A TOWARD RWY 28 BUT DID NOT SEE THE HOLD SHORT LINES ON TXWY (WHICH WAS OBSCURED BY SNOW) OR THE RWY IDENT SIGN ON TXWY A SHORT OF EXTENDED RWY 28 CTRLINE. COPLT SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ WHILE ON TXWY A AND TWR TOLD US TO HOLD OUR POS. THE NOSE OF MY ACFT WAS OVER THE EXTENDED S EDGE OF RWY 28. AN ACFT WAS ON A 3 MI FINAL TO RWY 28 AND WAS TOLD TO GAR. WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD TO TAXI ONTO RWY 28 AND WAIT. TKOF CLRNC WAS GIVEN UNEVENTFULLY. FACTORS: 1) UNFAMILIAR WITH AIRFIELD. 2) RAMP/TXWYS SNOW COVERED. 3) CONFUSING SIGNAGE. 4) CTLR SWITCHING BTWN FRENCH AND ENGLISH (CONSTANTLY) CAUSING MINOR LACK OF TOTAL SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. 5) CANADIAN CTLR VERBIAGE IS SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT THAN IN USA. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 327989: THE CAPT WAS NOT BRAKING TO STOP WHERE I THOUGHT HE SHOULD HAVE AND I EXCLAIMED; 'THAT'S THE RWY RIGHT THERE.' HE SAID; 'YEAH; I KNOW; WE'RE CLRED INTO POS; RIGHT?' AND I SAID 'NO!' HE EXPLAINED HE HAD BEEN TO MONTREAL A THOUSAND TIMES AND KNEW EXACTLY WHERE HE WAS. AN AIRBUS INITIATED A GAR (WHICH WAS APCHING RWY 28) BECAUSE THE CREW DIDN'T LIKE OUR PROX TO THE RWY. THE NOSE OF OUR ACFT WAS SEVERAL FT OVER THE EXTENDED RWY EDGE; ALTHOUGH WE WERE TECHNICALLY STILL ON TXWY A. THE CAPT WAS OVER CONFIDENT WITH HIS ABILITY TO FIND THE RWY ON HIS OWN AND DID NOT USE EFFECTIVE CREW RESOURCE MGMNT IN ALLOWING ME TO 'CATCH UP' AND FEEL COMFORTABLE WITH EXACTLY WHERE WE WERE AND WHAT OUR INSTRUCTIONS WERE. IF I COULD HAVE SEEN OUR POS IN RELATION TO THE RWY OUT THE L WINDOW; I WOULD HAVE APPLIED BRAKES MYSELF EARLIER.