AFTER BEING CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH; FLC RECEIVED 3 TCASII ALERTS WHILE ON THE APCH. CAUSE OF TCASII WAS A MIL T2 ON APCH BEHIND RPTR AND TWR NEVER ALERTED FLC TO TFC. COM WITH MIL ACFT WAS ON UHF SO RPTR ACFT DIDN'T HEAR COM. TWR SHOULD HAVE NOTIFIED RPTR FLC OF TFC PROX.

Date: 1996-02 · Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng · Phase: approach

Anomalies: conflict-nmac|other-unspecified

Synopsis

AFTER BEING CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH; FLC RECEIVED 3 TCASII ALERTS WHILE ON THE APCH. CAUSE OF TCASII WAS A MIL T2 ON APCH BEHIND RPTR AND TWR NEVER ALERTED FLC TO TFC. COM WITH MIL ACFT WAS ON UHF SO RPTR ACFT DIDN'T HEAR COM. TWR SHOULD HAVE NOTIFIED RPTR FLC OF TFC PROX.

Narrative

ARRIVING TO TLH; APCH CTL GAVE THE FLT A DSND TO 3000 FT. WE LEFT 10000 FT. A HDG WAS GIVEN AND WE RPTED THE ARPT IN SIGHT. APCH CTL POINTED OUT VFR TFC INBOUND FROM THE SSE; A HELI. THE HELI RPTED HAVING US IN SIGHT AND WAS INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW A VISUAL TO RWY 27. WE WERE GIVEN OUR PRESENT HDG TO JOIN THE FINAL AND CLRED THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 27. SHORTLY AFTER RECEIVING THIS CLRNC WE HEARD THE CTLR GIVING A CLRNC TO A MIL ACFT; WE WERE UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE FULL CLRNC BECAUSE THE CTLR WAS XMITTING TO THE ACFT ON UHF. AT FIRST I HAD THOUGHT THAT IT WAS ON A MIL RTE WHICH ARE AROUND TLH. PRIOR TO JOINING THE FINAL WE RECEIVED A TCASII TFC WARNING. AS WE LOOKED AT THE INDICATOR IT READ; 0.1 NM 0.0. THE DISPLAY SHOWED TFC AT OUR 6 O'CLOCK POS. UNABLE TO LOOK BEHIND US; WE THOUGHT THAT THIS MUST BE IN ERROR. AS WE CONTINUED AFTER JOINING THE FINAL APCH COURSE; ANOTHER TCASII TFC WARNING WAS RECEIVED. WE AGAIN LOOKED AT THE TCASII DIAL. IT READ; 0.1 NM 0.0. THIS TIME LIKE BEFORE THE TFC WAS AT THE 6 O'CLOCK POS. THIS TIME WE WERE NO MORE THAN 3 MI FROM THE RWY. STILL NOTHING FROM THE CTL TWR CONCERNING ANY TFC. AS WE CONTINUED WE NOTICED A SINGLE ENG CESSNA APCHING FROM OUR L AND KNEW OF HIS INTENTIONS; HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW US. AS WE LOOKED ON OUR TCASII DIAL WE SHOWED HIM AT THE RIGHT DISTANCE AND ALT FROM US; SO THIS MADE US THINK THAT THOSE OTHER 2 WARNINGS MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN WRONG. AT ABOUT 1/2 MI FINAL WE RECEIVED ANOTHER TCASII ALERT; AND AS BEFORE THE READING WAS THE SAME; 0.1 NM 0.0. AS WE STARTED THE FLARE; A FAST MOVING MIL JET FLEW PAST US ON THE R SIDE; HIS ALT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MORE THAN 300 FT; IF EVEN THAT HIGH. BEFORE HE REACHED THE DEP END OF THE RWY; HE MADE A SHARP R HAND CLBING TURN TO THE DOWNWIND; FROM WHICH HE RETURNED AND LANDED. AFTER WE MADE THE BLOCKS; I REQUESTED THE LCL TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR THE TWR SUPVR. LATER THAT AFTERNOON I MADE A CALL TO THE TWR SUPVR AT TLH. HE STATED THAT THE CTLR DIDN'T INFORM US OF THE T2 (TOAD) AND THAT HE SHOULD; AND AS TO MY QUESTION OF WHY HE WAS ALLOWED TO GET SO CLOSE DURING A VISUAL BEHIND; HE STATED THAT HE HAD SLOWED THE T2 TO 250 KTS WHEN HE SAW THAT WE HAD SLOWED; AND HE HAD GIVEN HIM A SPD OF 190 KTS WHEN WE HAD SLOWED EVEN FURTHER. I TOLD HIM OF OUR TCASII ALERTS AND HE COULDN'T UNDERSTAND WHY WE GOT THEM.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.