MLG FLC UNABLE TO MEET XING RESTR. ALSO HAS HDG DEV AND ALTDEV ON DSCNT.

Date: 1996-02 · Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Anomalies: deviation-altitude-crossing-restriction-not-met|deviation-altitude-overshoot|deviation-speed-all-types|deviation-track-heading-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy

Synopsis

MLG FLC UNABLE TO MEET XING RESTR. ALSO HAS HDG DEV AND ALTDEV ON DSCNT.

Narrative

ENRTE FROM PHX TO SLC; ZLA ADVISED US JAMMN 1 ARR LNDG S; APPROX AROUND THE BCE VOR AREA. AT DTA VOR WE WERE STILL ADVISED BY ZLC; JAMMN 1 ARR AND LNDG S. AFTER; OR AS DSCNT WAS STARTED; ZLC ADVISES JAMMN 1 ARR LNDG N AND CROSS JAMMN AT 14000 FT AT 250 KTS. DSCNT WAS PLANNED FOR JAMMN AT 17000 FT AND 320 KTS; PLUS THERE WAS A 100 KT TAILWIND AT FL330. JAMMN AT 14000 FT AND 250 KTS WAS NOT FEASIBLE AND ADVISED ZLC. HE SAID; SPD OF 250 KTS AT JAMMN AND THE BEST WE COULD ON THE ALT. I TUNED IN FFU AND THE 211 DEG RADIAL FOR THE TURN AT JAMMN. I LEFT THE FREQ TO ACQUIRE LATEST WX. WX WAS WX8 1/4 SWF; WIND 270/08 LNDG ILS RWYS 34R OR 35; 34L WAS CLOSED. APCH DSCNT CHKLIST WAS STARTED; FINISHED; AND THE APCH BRIEFING WAS STARTED FOR THE ILS RWY 34R. FREQ CHANGE TO SLC APCH CTL OCCURRED DURING THE APCH BRIEFING. CALLED APCH CTL; HIS FIRST WORDS WERE 'TURN R TO HDG OF 050 DEGS.' I LOOKED AT MY CDI AND IN FACT WE HAD CROSSED THE FFU 211 DEG RADIAL FLYING NBOUND. I ADVISED THE CAPT OF OUR MISTAKE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN. ONCE ON THE 050 DEG HDG; REMAINDER OF OPS TO THE ILS RWY 34R AND SUBSEQUENT LNDG WERE NORMAL AND UNEVENTFUL. JAMMN WAS CROSSED AT APPROX 16000 FT AND 270 KTS. FACTORS FOR THE ABOVE DEV: 1) CHANGING RWYS FROM S FLOW TO A N FLOW AND ALSO BEING #1 FOR THE RWY 34R APCH. ZLC SAID WE WERE THE FIRST ACFT FOR LNDG N. I ASSUME HE WANTED 250 KTS AT JAMMN SO ALL ACFT LNDG S COULD COMPLETE THEIR APCH WITHOUT CONFLICT FROM US (NOTE: THE STAR SAYS NOTHING ABOUT 250 KTS AT JAMMN WHEN LNDG N). 2) WORKLOAD INCREASED FOR ME BECAUSE LNDG N MEANT NEW WX; CALL COMPANY (EARLY ARR); AND START THE APCH DSCNT CHKLIST WITH AN APCH BRIEFING; ALL TO BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO 10000 FT. OBTAINING WX EARLIER WOULDN'T HAVE HELPED; FOR THE REASON THAT RWY CONFIGN CHANGED. 3) CAPT'S CONCERN WAS COMPOUNDED BY JAMMN AT 250 KTS; THE WX RPTED AT 1/4 MI SWF (WERE WE LEGAL TO DO THE ILS 34R APCH); AND THE 100 KT TAILWIND. ATIS DID NOT GIVE ANY RVR READINGS; WHICH WOULD HAVE HELPED SOMEWHAT. CAPT WAS TRYING TO DO HIS BEST TO MAKE THE RESTR AND TOTALLY FORGOT THE FLOW HAD CHANGED FROM S TO N. I WAS ENGROSSED IN OBTAINING WX; COMPANY CALL; APCH DSCNT CHKLIST; AND MOST IMPORTANTLY ILS RWY 34R APCH BRIEFING. I WAS ABSOLUTELY ZERO HELP TO THE CAPT WITH REGARD TO ACFT SIT AWARENESS WHILE ON THE ARR RTE.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.