ATC COMMUNICATED TO AN LR35 CORPORATE FLC THAT THEY HAD OVERSHOT THEIR ASSIGNED ALT. THE FLC WAS LOOKING FOR TFC WHICH THEY HAD IN SIGHT; AT THE TIME THAT THEY EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTY LEVELING THE ACFT.

Date: 1996-03 · Aircraft: Learjet 35

Anomalies: deviation-altitude-overshoot|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance

Synopsis

ATC COMMUNICATED TO AN LR35 CORPORATE FLC THAT THEY HAD OVERSHOT THEIR ASSIGNED ALT. THE FLC WAS LOOKING FOR TFC WHICH THEY HAD IN SIGHT; AT THE TIME THAT THEY EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTY LEVELING THE ACFT.

Narrative

DEPARTING IAH RWY 14L WE WERE GIVEN CLRNC FOR TKOF WITH AN IMMEDIATE L TURN TO HDG 020 DEGS AND 4000 FT. I LEVELED AT 4000 FT AND REDUCED PWR. I STARTED ACCELERATING TO 250 KTS WHEN WE WERE CLRED TO 5000 FT AND TFC WAS CALLED OUT TO US. I STARTED A GRADUAL CLB AND MY CO-CAPT SET THE ALT ALERTER TO 5000 FT. WE BOTH STARTED LOOKING FOR TFC AND DID NOT NOTICE THAT A HIGH RATE OF CLB HAD DEVELOPED UNTIL WITHIN A FEW HUNDRED FT OF OUR TARGET ALT. I LEVELED THE PLANE AGGRESSIVELY; BUT THE CTLR REPEATED 'MAINTAIN 5000 FT.' WE RPTED LEVEL AT 5000 FT AND CHKED THAT ALTIMETER SETTINGS WERE CORRECT. THE CTLR RPTED OUR MODE C READ 5400 FT. WE SWITCHED TO THE SECONDARY XPONDER; BUT WERE CLRED TO 15000 FT AND HANDED OFF TO THE CTR CTLR BEFORE WE COULD DETERMINE IF THE PROB WAS WITH THE XPONDER. NO OTHER PROBS WERE RPTED TO US; SO I THINK THE PROB MAY HAVE BEEN RELATED TO THE STATIC SYS AND THE LARGE PITCH CHANGE ASSOCIATED WITH LEVELING FROM A HIGH RATE OF CLB. IN THE FUTURE; AS A CORRECTIVE ACTION; I WILL BE MORE CAUTIOUS WITH HIGH CLB AND DSCNT RATES IMMEDIATELY BEFORE REACHING AN ASSIGNED ALT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 330880: I NOTICED A MAX ALT OF 5200 FT BEFORE HE RETURNED TO 5000 FT. DEP CTLR ADVISED US TO MAINTAIN 5000 FT AND THAT HE SHOWED 5400 FT. I ADVISED WE WERE LEVEL AT 5000 FT AND SWITCHED TO SECOND XPONDER. THE INCIDENT WAS OBVIOUSLY CAUSED BY INATTN TO THE MOST IMMEDIATE PRIORITY; LEVELING AT ASSIGNED ALT. BY OUR BOTH LOOKING OUTSIDE FOR XING TFC (WHICH WE DID HAVE IN SIGHT) AND NOT TENDING TO GOOD COCKPIT PROC REGARDING CALLOUTS.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.