DURING PUSHBACK ACFT AND TUG STRIKE EACH OTHER. ACFT DAMAGED.

Narrative

THE #1 ENG WAS STARTED AT GATE; LGA. THE APU WAS INOP. AFTER RECEIVING CLRNC TO PUSH FROM GND CTL THE PUSHBACK BEGAN. I WAS MONITORING GND CTL AND COMPANY OPS ON MY HEADSET. THE CAPT WAS COORDINATING THE PUSHBACK WITH THE GND CREW WITH USE OF THE INTERPHONE AND HIS HEADSET. AFTER WE HAD PUSHED BACK APPROX 50 YARDS THE CAPT GAVE THE COMMAND TO START 2 OR THE #2 ENG. I DID AS HE SAID. AT ABOUT THE TIME THE ENG WAS STARTED AND I HAD RELEASED THE START VALVE; THE ACFT BEGAN TO MOVE FORWARD; AND IT SLIGHTLY INCREASED SPD. AT THIS POINT WE FELT A JERK TO THE NOSEGEAR AREA. I LOOKED AT THE CAPT AND NOTICED A GND CREW PERSON WITH CROSSED WANDS RUN INTO VIEW FROM THE REAR. THE CAPT NOTICED THIS AT THE SAME TIME AND SHUT DOWN THE ENGS. HE CALLED FOR THE AFTER LNDG AND PARKING CHKLIST. I DID AS HE REQUESTED. I OPERATED UNDER DIRECTION OF THE CAPT AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AIRLINE'S OPS MANUAL. THE ACFT HAD MOVED FORWARD CAUSING THE TUG TO STRIKE THE ACFT ON THE LOWER L FORWARD FUSELAGE. A HOLE IN THE ACFT RESULTED. I BELIEVE WHAT REALLY CAUSED THE PROB WAS A FAULTY INTERPHONE OR MICROPHONE/XMITTER SYS ON THE PART OF THE GND CREW. CONTRIBUTING; WAS THE FAILURE OF THE GND CREW TO GIVE CORRECT; TIMELY; AND APPROPRIATE INFO TO THE CAPT. FURTHERMORE; IF MAINT AND/OR OPS KNEW THAT THE APU WAS INOP AND THAT A GATE START WAS REQUIRED; THE ACFT SHOULD HAVE BEEN PLACED ON A GATE THAT ALLOWED THE START OF BOTH ENGS AT THE GATE. IF THE GND CREW WOULD HAVE TOLD THE CAPT TO SET THE PARKING BRAKE; AND MADE SURE THE DIRECTION WAS UNDERSTOOD AND ACCOMPLISHED THE ENTIRE SIT WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED.