MLG PLT ON IOE FOR CAPT HAS DIFFICULTY WITH CKP AND THEY HAVE A HDG DEV ON CLBOUT.
Synopsis
MLG PLT ON IOE FOR CAPT HAS DIFFICULTY WITH CKP AND THEY HAVE A HDG DEV ON CLBOUT.
Narrative
I WAS FLYING; RECEIVING IOE IN PREPARATION FOR AN FAR OBSN THAT WOULD TAKE PLACE THE FOLLOWING DAY. DURING THIS PROC THE CAPT CANDIDATE IN THE L SEAT (ME IN THIS CASE) IS SUPPOSED TO ACT AS CAPT AND 'RUN THE SHOW.' HOWEVER; THIS IS OBVIOUSLY INHIBITED BY THE FACT THAT THE FO IS REALLY A CHK AIRMAN (AND PIC) WHO ULTIMATELY CAN HAVE THE CANDIDATE REMOVED FROM HIS STATUS OR WORSE IF HE IS DISPLEASED. THERE IS A CHAMELEON LIKE SHIFTING OF ROLES BY MANY CHK AIRMEN IN THIS SIT; IE; 'WHAT IF THIS WERE A DARK RAINY NIGHT AND I WERE A LOW TIME WEAK FO?' (WHEN THE REALITY IS THAT IT IS A SUNNY DAY AND YOU ARE AN EXPERIENCED CHK AIRMAN.) WITH THAT AS BACKGND; WE WERE TAKING OFF ON RWY 36 DCA; NOISE ABATEMENT PROCS (WHICH ARE IN THEMSELVES NOT DEPICTED AS CLRLY AS POSSIBLE); FOLLOW THE RIVER TO 4.0 DME; THEN EITHER FOLLOW THE RIVER OR 328 DEG RADIAL DCA. I TOLD THE PNF TO SLOW MY HDG BUG SO I COULD FOLLOW THE RIVER (SINCE SOMETIMES THE ACFT STRUCTURE OBSCURES THE VIEW). I HAD MISDIALED THE VOR FREQ (PROBABLY 110.0 OR 110.1 INSTEAD OF 111.0 -- TOO MANY ONES! IT'S EASY TO MISDIAL THIS ONE). I WAS INHIBITED IN TELLING THIS GUY TO DO ANYTHING SINCE HE ACTUALLY REVERTED TO THE 'CAPT' PERSONALITY AND WOULD RETORT TO MY INSTRUCTIONS/REQUEST; 'I KNOW THAT...; ETC.' AT ABOUT 4 DME HE ASKED IF I COULD SEE THE RIVER. I REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE. HE RESPONDED THE RIVER WAS TO HIS R. I SAID; 'I TOLD YOU TO SLOW THE HDG BUG SO I WOULD FOLLOW THE RIVER.' ATC THEN ASKED WHERE WE WERE WITH REF TO THE RADIAL. I HAD NOTICED THE RED 'OFF' FLAGS ON MY VOR PREVIOUSLY. IN ANY OTHER SIT I WOULD HAVE ASKED THE FO TO RETUNE MY RADIO BUT I WAS ALMOST PARANOID ABOUT CALLING THE CHK AIRMAN'S ATTN TO MY ERROR. HAD HE FOLLOWED MY INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE HDG BUG (SECOND ITEM IN THE CHAIN) WE WOULD HAVE STAYED OVER THE RIVER. AFTER IOE WAS OVER; I FLEW A TRIP WITH THIS PLT IN WHICH HE MADE MANY PROCEDURAL ERRORS; SOME IDENTICAL TO ONES HE HAD CRITICIZED ME FOR AND MANY WORSE. I PREFER A COCKPIT ATMOSPHERE WHERE UNINTENTIONAL ERRORS ARE TREATED CONSTRUCTIVELY AND WITHOUT DESTRUCTIVE CRITICISM.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.