PLT OF AN SMA SEL MADE AN OFF ARPT FORCED LNDG AFTER THE ENG QUIT DUE TO FUEL STARVATION.

Narrative

THE SECOND LEG WAS NOW LONGER -- 3.6 HRS PLANNED WITH 440 NM AND A FUEL ON BOARD OF 4 1/2 HRS. THIS LEG WAS PLANNED AT A MORE FAVORABLE ALT FOR WINDS AND LEANING THE ENG. A FUEL CHK WAS ACCOMPLISHED 40 MINS PRIOR TO LNDG OVER A POTENTIAL DIVERT BASE AFTER ARTCC REROUTING WAS RECEIVED TO SHORTEN THE FLT SLIGHTLY. IT WAS FELT THAT BASED ON COMPUTED FLT DURATION AND QUANTITY ON GAUGES THAT I WOULD LAND WITH 1 HR FUEL IN TANKS. ON 8 MI FINAL THE ENG SPUTTERED AND I CHANGED FROM R TANK (2 GAL) TO L TANK (5 GAL) AND PWR WAS REGAINED. AT 3 MI THE ENG QUIT AND HEADWINDS MANDATED A FORCED LNDG. SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION REVEALED THE PA28 OPERATORS MANUAL AND ENG (LYCOMING) MANUFACTURER'S MANUAL DIFFERED IN FUEL CONSUMPTION RATES FOR SUCH A LEG BY 10 GALS. ALL THAT WAS AVAILABLE TO THE PLT/ACFT AT THE TIME WAS THE PA28 MANUAL THAT SHOWED LOWER GPH RATES. THE FUEL GAUGES SHOWED SUFFICIENT FUEL YET IT WAS UNKNOWN (BY THE PLT) THAT THE NON-CAPACITIVE GAUGES ARE NEVER TO BE TRUSTED. XCOUNTRY FUEL MGMNT AND LEANING PROCS HAD NOT BEEN COVERED IN THE CHKOUT. THE PLT WAS UNAWARE OF THE HIGHER FUEL CONSUMPTION RATE; INACCURACY OF THE FUEL GAUGES; AND PROPER LEANING PROCS. MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN AT THE AERO CLUB TO CORRECT THIS AND START A PROGRAM TO BETTER PREPARE EXPERIENCED MIL PLTS FOR THE DANGEROUS/DIFFERENCES IN GA EQUIP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO THE ACFT DURING THE OFF ARPT FORCED LNDG. HE NOW LEARNED THE PROPER DATA ABOUT FUEL GAUGES AND COMPUTING FUEL USAGE AND PASSES ON THIS INFO TO PLTS WHENEVER POSSIBLE IN PLT MEETINGS; ETC.