THE SUPVR WAS ADVISED BY THE TMU THAT A SECTOR WAS PREDICTED TO EXCEED THE OPERATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE LIMIT OF TFC. THE TMU ASKED IF THERE WAS ANYTHING THE SUPVR WANTED THEM TO DO. THE SUPVR ANSWERED NO.

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THIS MORNING AT XX00 LCL I WAS WORKING AT ZOA SECTOR 32 WHEN THE TFC BEGAN TO BUILD PAST WHAT MOST WOULD CALL 'MODERATE' INTO 'HVY.' BEFORE I REALIZED IT I HAD MORE DATA BLOCKS ON MY SCOPE THAN I HAD ROOM TO OFFSET THEM. ACFT WERE CHKING ON FREQ AND MAKING REQUESTS TWICE AS FAST AS THEY COULD BE ANSWERED. I HAD 1 KING-AIR THAT WAS FLYING AGAINST THE TFC FLOW THAT NEEDED A DSCNT CLRNC TO LAND AT STOCKTON. I WAS FORCED TO HOLD THAT ACFT ABOVE FL240 UNTIL APPROX 15 MI FROM THE ARPT. I LATER LEARNED THAT THE ZOA TMU CALLED (VIA TELEPHONE) MY SUPVR TO ADVISE HIM THAT SECTOR 32 WAS PREDICTED TO EXCEED THE OPERATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE LIMIT OF TFC AND IF THERE WAS ANYTHING THAT MY SUPVR WANTED THEM TO DO. THE ANSWER WAS NO. THIS FAILURE TO TAKE DECISIVE ACTION (PERHAPS BECAUSE OF CONSTANT PRESSURE FROM AIRLINES TO REDUCE ATC DELAYS) LED TO A NEAR OUT OF CTL SIT. IT TOOK EVERY BIT OF CAPACITY I HAD TO KEEP THE MENTAL PICTURE OF MY SECTOR. INCIDENTALLY AT XX15; AND ABOUT 5 MINS AFTER THE WORST WAS OVER; I LOST THE USE OF MY XMITTERS DUE TO A STILL UNDETERMINED REASON. HAD THIS FAILURE OCCURRED AT XX10 THE CONSEQUENCES COULD'VE BEEN TRAGIC.