WDB ACFT TKOF DTW WITH IMPROPER FUEL LOADING.
Synopsis
WDB ACFT TKOF DTW WITH IMPROPER FUEL LOADING.
Narrative
DEP WAS DELAYED BECAUSE ACFT'S AUTOMATIC FUELING SHUT- OFFS CLOSED EARLY AND PREVENTED FUEL FROM BEING ADDED. VARIOUS MAINT PROCS WERE ATTEMPTED WITHOUT CORRECTING THE PROB. ABOUT 6 HRS PASSED AND SOME PAX WERE OFF-LOADED AND REBOOKED. ALSO SOME CARGO WAS OFF-LOADED. THE RESULT WAS THAT THE FUEL ON BOARD WAS ADEQUATE FOR DISPATCH. BECAUSE OF MAINT PERSONNEL TRANSFERRING FUEL BTWN TANKS IN THEIR EFFORT TO CORRECT PROB; FUEL LOAD WAS 'NON STANDARD.' TANK QTYS WERE RELAYED TO WT AND BAL PERSONNEL THROUGH THE DISPATCHER. DURING PUSHBACK WE RECEIVED A RADIO MESSAGE THAT #2 MAIN HAD TO BE BURNED DOWN TO 84.5 BEFORE TKOF AND WE COMPLIED. I MONITORED COMPANY RADIO FREQ IN CASE ADDITIONAL INFO WAS BROADCAST BEFORE TKOF; NONE WAS HEARD. AFTER TKOF; SINCE IT WAS AN AUGMENTED CREW; I TOOK A 3 HR BREAK. UPON RETURNING TO THE COCKPIT I WAS TOLD THAT DISPATCH HAD SENT AN ACARS MESSAGE THAT THE OUTBOARD RESERVES HAD TO BE 'FULL' FOR THE TKOF TO BE LEGAL. MESSAGE WAS DISCOVERED IN QUEUE ABOUT 1 HR AFTER TKOF. CREW MEMBERS IN THE COCKPIT TOLD ME THEY HAD SENT A MESSAGE THAT RESERVES HAD BEEN 'FULL' FOR THE TKOF (THEY HAD ACTUALLY BEEN SHORT BY 600-1000 LBS). TKOF PERFORMANCE APPEARED NORMAL. WE WERE SOMEWHAT AT A DISADVANTAGE IN DISCOVERING THE PROB OURSELVES; SINCE OUR ONLY WAY OF DETERMINING THE REQUIREMENT RESTR WAS AN OBSCURE NOTE IN OUR COCKPIT OPERATING MANUAL. WE RELIED ON 'THE AIRLINE'S SYS' TO KEEP US OUT OF TROUBLE AND IT DIDN'T WORK VERY WELL.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.