THE RPTR IN A CESSNA 152 WAS PASSED OFFSET WITHIN A HALF MI BY A LARGE GREEN 4 ENG MIL TRANSPORT. THE RPTR SUBSEQUENTLY CAUGHT 2 ALARMING ABRUPT WAKE ENCOUNTERS ABOUT 10 SECONDS APART. THE CESSNA 152 ROLLED ABOUT 20 DEGS. THE RPTR WOULD HAVE TURNED L AWAY FROM THE TRANSPORT BUT TO DO SO WOULD HAVE CAUSED THE RPTR TO ENTER CLASS D AIRSPACE.

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I WAS NEBOUND AT THE ABOVE LOCATION WHEN I SPOTTED THE MIL TRANSPORT ACFT PASSING ME. HIS COURSE WAS APPROX PARALLEL TO MINE AND HE WAS ABOUT 500-1000 FT TO MY R. I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT WAKE TURB AND WOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY TURNED L; BUT THAT WOULD HAVE PUT ME IN LAKEHURST'S (NEL) CLASS D. I DECIDED THAT WAKE TURB WAS NOT A FACTOR AND THAT NO COLLISION HAZARD EXISTED (THE OTHER ACFT WAS MUCH FASTER) SO I CONTINUED ON COURSE. TURNING R WOULD HAVE PUT ME RIGHT UNDER HIS WAKE (?). ABOUT 1-2 MINS LATER; I ENCOUNTERED HIS WAKE TURB: 2 'CHOPS' ABOUT 15 SECONDS APART. I MAINTAINED CTL AND MY BANK DID NOT EXCEED 20 DEGS. I KNOW IT WAS WAKE TURB; BECAUSE THE AIR WAS SMOOTH AND THE 'CHOPS' WERE SHARP AND ABRUPT. I THEN TURNED R (REMEMBERING THAT THE WIND WAS FROM THE E) AND HAD NO FURTHER TURB. SOME OBSERVATIONS: THIS ALERT AREA (A-200) SHOULD BE EXPANDED (LOW-FLYING; HVY MIL ACFT FREQUENTLY OPERATE AT LOW ALTS E OF THE AREA). THE FAA SHOULD MORE HEAVILY PUBLICIZE THE DANGERS ON ALERT AREAS. VFR PLTS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED NOT TO SKIRT CLASS D AIRSPACE UNLESS THEY HAVE THE ATC FACILITY TUNED IN (IF I WERE PREPARED; I COULD HAVE SIMULTANEOUSLY TURNED L AND CALLED LAKEHURST). I HAD A XPONDER OPERATING IN MODE C; 1200. THE OTHER ACFT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE OF MY POS AND ALTERED HIS COURSE SLIGHTLY. LOW FLYING HVY ACFT POSE A THREAT TO HIGH ACFT AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERATE TO THEM! ALTHOUGH I WAS MONITORING MCGUIRE APCH (120.25) I WAS NOT PARTICIPATING IN 'FLT FOLLOWING.' I AM RELUCTANT TO PARTICIPATE DUE TO MY UNFAMILIARITY WITH IT. I HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO GET MUCH INFO ON IT FROM FEDERAL PUBS (OR FROM PVT PUBS). THE FAA SHOULD ENCOURAGE FLT FOLLOWING AND EXPLAIN HOW TO USE IT. IT WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS INCIDENT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTING CAUSES WERE HIS OPS SO CLOSE TO THE EDGE OF THE MIL SPECIAL USE AIRSPACE. ALSO; HE DIDN'T THINK THE MIL ACFT KNEW HE WAS THERE. FINALLY; THE RPTR FELT HE HAD PLACED HIMSELF AT A POINT HE COULD NOT TURN L BECAUSE OF THE LAKEHURST CLASS D AIRSPACE. HE SAID OTHER THAN NOT GETTING HIMSELF HEMMED IN HE CAN'T THINK OF ANYTHING HE WOULD DO DIFFERENTLY. HE SAID HE THOUGHT ABOUT CLBING BUT FIGURED HE DID NOT HAVE A FAST ENOUGH RATE OF CLB. THE CHANGES HE WOULD SUGGEST WOULD BE TO MAKE THE ALERT AREA BIGGER TO ACCOMMODATE THE MIL ACFT THAT REGULARLY OPERATE OUTSIDE OF THEIR AIRSPACE. HE BELIEVES THERE SHOULD BE MORE PUBLICITY GIVEN TO THE DANGERS OF SKIRTING CLOSELY SPECIAL USE AIRSPACE; AND THE BENEFITS OF GAINING TA'S/ FLT FOLLOWING.