POOR CRM AND A LATE DSCNT CLRNC DURING A HVY COCKPIT WORKLOAD ARE CITED AS CONTRIBUTING TO AN ACR FLC'S FAILURE TO MEET A XING RESTR. THE ARTCC RADAR CTLR ISSUED A NEW CLRNC AS A RESULT OF THE CREW'S FAILURE TO MEET THE RESTR.
Synopsis
POOR CRM AND A LATE DSCNT CLRNC DURING A HVY COCKPIT WORKLOAD ARE CITED AS CONTRIBUTING TO AN ACR FLC'S FAILURE TO MEET A XING RESTR. THE ARTCC RADAR CTLR ISSUED A NEW CLRNC AS A RESULT OF THE CREW'S FAILURE TO MEET THE RESTR.
Narrative
APCHING COS FROM THE W AT FL260; 100 NM FROM PIKE'S PEAK. CAPT: 'PLEASE CALL FSS DEN AND GET COS AND PUB WX.' THERE'S A RECORDING. CAPT: 'TRY ABQ FSS.' FO LATER STATES; 'OK. ABQ FSS SAYS IF I STAY ON THE LINE HE'LL HAVE NEW WX IN ABOUT 4 MINS.' ATC CLRNC: 'FLT XYZ; TURN L HDG 030 DEGS; INTERCEPT THE COS 213 DEG RADIAL.' CAPT READBACK: 'L TURN HDG 030 DEGS TO INTERCEPT THE COS 213 DEG RADIAL.' CAPT ENGAGES HDG SELECT 030 DEGS; SELECTS NAV; AND MANUALLY TUNES COS. THE 213 DEG RADIAL MATCHES HDG SELECT WITH INBOUND TRACK OF 033 DEGS. FO: 'DO YOU WANT ME TO LOAD THE FMS?' CAPT: 'YES; PLEASE; THANKS.' ATC CLRNC: 'FLT XYZ CROSS 25 MI W OF COS AT 16000 FT.' CAPT: 'WHAT WAS THAT? DID HE SAY 20 MI W OF COS AT 16000 FT?' FO: 'UMMMM; I'LL CHK.' FO LOADS FMC FOR XING RESTR (FMC DISPLAYS WAYPOINT COS-1 AT 60 MI) THEN SAYS; 'BOX IS LOADED!' (FO STILL PUNCHING BUTTONS ON FMC PANEL). CAPT LOOKS DOWN AT THE FMC DISPLAY. IT INDICATES COS-1 AT 11 MI. HE CLOSES THE THRUST LEVERS; APPLIES SPD BRAKES; AND INITIATES A 4000 FPM DSCNT RATE. CAPT: 'ZDV; FLT XYZ; WE'RE NOT GOING TO MAKE THE XING RESTR.' ATC CLRNC: 'FLT XYZ; CONTINUE DSCNT TO 16000 FT AND SLOW TO 250 KTS.' FO: 'CAPT; I AM SO SORRY I LOADED THE FIX E OF COS; NOT W OF COS.' CAPT: 'DSCNT AND APCH CHKLIST.' ATC CLRNC: 'FLT XYZ; TURN L HDG 300 DEGS AND DSND TO 10000 FT.' FO MISSES CALL. CAPT: 'L 300 DEGS; CONTINUE DSCNT 10000 FT; HDG SELECT 030 DEGS.' ATC: 'CONTINUE TURN TO 270 DEGS.' FO MISSES CALL AGAIN AS HE READS CHKLIST ALOUD. CAPT: 'L TURN 270 DEGS.' CAPT DIALS IN HDG. ATC CLRNC: 'FLT XYZ; I'M GOING TO NEED YOU TO TURN NOW; STOP DSCNT AT 12000 FT.' CAPT: 'DAMN IT; TO WHAT HDG? ASK HIM.' ATC: 'L TURN 270 DEGS; STOP DSCNT AT 12000 FT.' FO: 'ROGER; L 270 DEGS; DSND TO 12000 FT.' CAPT: 'TURN HDG SELECT TO 270 DEGS.' FO: 'DO YOU WANT ME TO CALL COMPANY?' CAPT: 'NO! FORGET COMPANY -- I NEED YOU WITH ME ON THE RADIO.' CAPT AND FO RESYNCHED AND THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WENT SMOOTHLY. CAPT ALLOWED FO TO BE OFF-LINE FOR TOO LONG TO OBTAIN WX. (PIKE'S PEAK BLOCKS RECEPTION OF COS ATIS FROM THE W AND THE WX WAS KNOWN TO BE MARGINAL.) CAPT'S NEED FOR UPDATED WX WAS VALID; BUT COCKPIT OPS BECAME TOO BUSY TO JUSTIFY SEVERANCE OF CREW COM. FO WAS EAGER AND PERHAPS OVERZEALOUS AND MISLOADED FMC. UP TO THIS POINT FO HAD PERFORMED FLAWLESSLY. ATC CHANGED OUR DSCNT PROFILE (DUE TO WX) RIGHT AT; OR VERY CLOSE TO THE TOP OF DSCNT. INSTEAD OF A XING RESTR; ATC COULD HAVE ISSUED A STANDARD 'DSND AND MAINTAIN 16000 FT; GOOD RATE OF DSCNT.' LESSONS LEARNED: CREW COM DETERIORATED DUE TO LACK OF FMC INPUT FEEDBACK AND BEING 'OFF-LINE' DURING A CRITICAL; LABOR INTENSIVE PERIOD OF FLT.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.