ARPT HAD JUST GONE VFR AFTER BEING BELOW VFR MINIMA FOR A WHILE. NUMEROUS ACFT WERE ENTERING DOWNWIND FOR EITHER RWY 11 OR RWY 36. AN ACR DHC6 WAS TOLD TO ENTER R BASE FOR RWY 11 WHILE INBOUND FROM THE SE AND HAD AN NMAC WITH A VFR CESSNA INBOUND FOR RWY 36. THE DHC6 TOOK EVASIVE ACTION. TWR JUST RECENTLY WENT FROM FAA CTL TO A CONTRACT TWR. RPTR SAYS TOO MUCH TFC FOR CTLR TO SAFELY HANDLE.

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UPON ARR IN ACFT ACR X; THE WX WAS RPTED ON ATIS AS BELOW BASIC VFR. WE CALLED BETHEL TWR 10 DME SE AND REQUESTED A SPECIAL VFR CLRNC WITH A SE TRANSITION. WE WERE TOLD TO RPT 1 MI FROM THE CLASS D SURFACE AREA. WE RPTED 1 MI FROM THE SURFACE AREA ON THE BETHEL 135 DEG RADIAL. THE TWR INSTRUCTED US TO MAINTAIN VFR AND HOLD OUTSIDE THE SURFACE AREA. WE COMPLIED AND ENTERED A HOLD ON THE 135 DEG RADIAL. OUTBOUND IN THE HOLD THE TWR RPTED THE FIELD AS VFR. THE TWR BEGAN CLRING ACFT INTO THE TFC PATTERN FROM THE NE FOR A R DOWNWIND ENTRY FOR RWY 36. OTHER ACFT WERE ALSO CLRED IN FROM THE SW FOR RWYS 36 AND 11. THE TWR CLRED OUR ACFT IN FROM THE SE FOR A R BASE TO RWY 11; AND REQUESTED WE RPT ON R BASE. I REPEATEDLY REQUESTED VERIFICATION; SINCE THIS INSTRUCTION WAS NOT CONSISTENT WITH A NORMAL PATTERN ENTRY AND WOULD PUT US IN CONFLICT WITH TFC IN THE RWY 36 TFC PATTERN. THE CAPT SLOWED THE ACFT TO MINIMUM APCH SPD TO ALLOW MORE TIME TO MESH WITH OTHER TFC IN THE PATTERN FOR RWY 36. THE LCL CTLR FAILED TO RESPOND TO OUR RADIO CALLS; SO WE PROCEEDED TO ENTER R TFC FOR RWY 11. THE TWR THEN RPTED 2 ACFT (ONE TO OUR L AND ONE ON THE R) ON R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 36. WE RPTED BOTH TFC IN SIGHT. THE TWR THEN INSTRUCTED US TO INITIATE A R TURN. AT THAT TIME; WE BELIEVED A R TURN WOULD HAVE PUT US IN CONFLICT WITH THE ACFT TO OUR R. IN DISCRETION OF SAFETY WE INFORMED THE TWR THAT WE WERE PROCEEDING TO FOLLOW THE ACFT TO OUR L; AT WHICH TIME THE CTLR CLRED US TO ENTER THE R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 36. UPON INITIATING THE L TURN; A CESSNA; WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY BLOCKED FROM VIEW BY OUR R WING; WAS SPOTTED BY US SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE CESSNA WAS ABOVE US BY APPROX 200 FT AND SLIGHTLY TO THE R OF OUR POS. THE CAPT INCREASED HIS L BANK TO PROVIDE GREATER SEPARATION AND TO AVOID AN EMER CONFLICT WITH THE CESSNA. AT THAT TIME THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO CONTINUE ON THE R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 36. AFTER EXTENDING DOWNWIND AT THE TWR'S REQUEST; WE WERE ISSUED A LNDG CLRNC. WE LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. I BELIEVE OUR PROB WAS A RESULT OF THE FOLLOWING FACTORS: 1) THE LARGE NUMBER OF ACFT OPERATING IN THE ATA AT THE SAME TIME; 2) FREQ CONGESTION WHICH DID NOT ALLOW PLTS TO VERIFY CLRNCS OR INSTRUCTIONS; 3) INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY CTLRS WHICH ARE IMPOSSIBLE TO COMPLY WITH DUE TO CONFLICTING TFC; AND 4) POSSIBLE ERRONEOUS CLRNCS AND INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY CTLRS DUE TO THEIR WORKLOAD OR INEXPERIENCE. BETHEL ATCT WAS RECENTLY TAKEN OVER BY A PVT CONTRACTOR WHICH USED FAA CTLRS FAMILIAR WITH LCL OPS TO TRAIN ITS NEW PERSONNEL. I FEEL THE NON FEDERAL CTLRS WERE RELEASED FROM TRAINING BEFORE THEY COULD ADEQUATELY CTL THE SOMETIMES LARGE VOLUME OF TFC THAT EXISTS IN THIS AREA. IN FACT; THE NEW NON FEDERAL CTLRS FREQUENTLY MAKE ERRORS; EVEN DURING LIGHT TFC PERIODS; WHICH REDUCES ALL PLTS CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ABILITY TO PROPERLY SEQUENCE ACFT. A RECURRENCE OF THIS SIT COULD BE PREVENTED BY GIVING TRANSITIONING CTLRS ADEQUATE TIME TO TRAIN UNDER SUPERVISION DURING HVY TFC PERIODS. ADDITIONALLY; DURING PEAK TFC PERIODS CTLRS SHOULD BE PREPARED TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF ACFT ENTERING THEIR AIRSPACE BEFORE IT REACHES A SIMILAR LEVEL OF SATURATION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 350894: I ALSO DISCUSSED CONFLICT WITH TWR CTLR/SUPVR AND NO FURTHER ACTION WAS DEEMED NECESSARY BY EITHER PARTY.