A PA28 PLT; IN FORMATION WITH A C172; ENCOUNTERED WAKE TURB FROM THE LEAD ACFT.

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MYSELF AND ANOTHER PLT ARRIVED IN THE LUK AREA AS A FLT OF 2 ACFT (C172 AND PA28-181). WHEN WE WERE ON APPROX A 3 MI R BASE FOR RWY 25; WE WERE REQUIRED TO FLY A L 360 DEG TURN FOR SPACING; BEHIND A TRAINING ACFT WHO WAS NOT FOLLOWING THE TWR'S DIRECTIONS. UPON COMPLETING THE 360 DEG TURN; WE WERE CLRED TO LAND AS A FLT OF 2. ON VERY SHORT FINAL TO RWY 25; I BEGAN GAINING ON THE C172 AT A GREATER RATE OF SPD THAN ANTICIPATED. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A SAFE DISTANCE; I BEGAN TO PERFORM S-TURNS AT A FAIRLY LOW ALT (300-100 FT AGL). DURING MY LAST S-TURN; I ENCOUNTERED WAKE TURB FROM THE PRECEDING ACFT. MY BANK ANGLE DURING THE LAST S-TURN WAS APPROX 30 DEGS IN EACH DIRECTION; JUST SHORT OF THE RWY THRESHOLD AT APPROX 100 FT AGL. AT NO TIME WAS POSITIVE CTL OF THE AIRPLANE A CONCERN AND THERE WAS NEVER ANY DOUBT AS TO SAFELY COMPLETING THE MANEUVER AND LNDG. HOWEVER; MANEUVERING OF THIS TYPE COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY IMMEDIATELY PERFORMING A 'GAR;' INSTEAD OF SALVAGING THE APCH AND LNDG. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE DECISION TO CONTINUE THE APCH AND LNDG INCLUDED: WE WERE A FLT OF 2; WITH THE LEAD ACFT PERFORMING ALL NAV AND COMS WITH THE TWR -- THE MINDSET WAS TO COMPLETE THE FLT AS ARRANGED. TAXIING ACFT IN FRONT OF OUR FLT OF 2 DID NOT FOLLOW DIRECTIONS CREATING ADDITIONAL WORKLOAD FOR TWR PERSONNEL. I DID NOT WANT TO ADD TO THE SIT. THERE WERE ADDITIONAL ACFT BEHIND US; IN LINE TO LAND. I KNEW THAT SAFETY WAS NOT AN ISSUE. THE RESULT WAS AN APCH WHICH WAS UNSTABILIZED AND REQUIRED EXCESSIVE BANKING AT A LOW ALT JUST PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN; WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY MAKING THE DECISION TO 'GAR' ONCE SPACING BECAME AN ISSUE.