POTENTIAL CONFLICT CREATED BY MIL FLC DEV FROM CLRNC AT A MIL FACILITY IN A NIGHT OP.

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WE HAD JUST COMPLETED A TOUCH-AND-GO TO RWY 21 WHEN WE NOTICED HEAD-ON TFC MAKING AN APCH TO RWY 3. TWR TOLD US TO TURN TO A SW HDG; WHICH WE DID. TWR THEN MADE A COMMENT THAT LED THE CREW (CAPT; COPLT; AND FE) TO BELIEVE THAT THE DC9 HEAD-ON TFC WAS GOING TO ENTER A DOWNWIND FOR RWY 21. THIS WOULD HAVE MEANT THAT WE WERE AGAIN ON A COLLISION COURSE WITH THE DC9. I TOOK CTL OF THE AIRPLANE AND MADE AN ABRUPT L TURN XING THE RWY CTRLINE AND ENTERING A DOWNWIND FOR RWY 27. WE SOON DISCOVERED THAT THE DC9 WAS LNDG ON RWY 3 AFTER ALL. THE TWR CTLR WAS EXTREMELY UPSET AND SAID HE WAS GOING TO PULL THE TAPES. A POSTFLT DEBRIEF VALIDATED THAT ALL 3 CREW MEMBERS (CAPT; COPLT; AND FE) HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT TWR WAS TELLING US THAT THE DC9 WAS ENTERING A DOWNWIND FOR RWY 21. I TALKED TO THE TWR CHIEF THE FOLLOWING DAY AND THE FOLLOWING POINTS WERE BROUGHT OUT. 1) IT IS NOT A REAL GOOD IDEA TO HAVE OPPOSING TFC SIMULTANEOUSLY MAKING APCHS TO THE SAME RWY (RWY 21/3). 2) IF AN ACFT HAS TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION IT SHOULD BE THE ACFT THAT IS IN STABLE FLT AT A SAFE ALT. NOT AN ACFT AT 100 FT; AT NIGHT; OVER A BLACKED OUT OCEAN. THE DC9 SHOULD HAVE BEEN SPUN (360 DEGS). 3) THE CTLR MEANT TO TELL US TO ENTER A DOWNWIND FOR RWY 3. HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT UNDERSTANDABLE TO THE CREW IN A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. 4) THE CTLR SHOULD NOT HAVE RESPONDED IN A THREATENING MANNER. 5) THERE WERE STUDENTS IN THE TWR AND ON THE ACFT. THIS ADDED TO THE STRESS AND CONFUSION. NO FURTHER ACTION WAS TO BE TAKEN BY EITHER PARTY. I DID TELL THE TWR CHIEF THAT I WAS GOING TO FILE THIS RPT.