NMAC BTWN A BEECH KING AIR 350 LNDG AND ANOTHER UNKNOWN ACFT TAXIING AFTER LNDG BACK ACROSS THE RWY IN FRONT OF THE LNDG KING AIR.

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AT APPROX XA40 PM ON DEC SUN 1996; AFTER XING THE NUMBERS OF RWY 25 AT 4000 FT; I WAS TOLD TO FOLLOW THE TFC AND CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 19L. UPON CONTACTING TWR; LNDG CLRNC WAS ISSUED FOR RWY 19L. WHILE ON FINAL; THE PRECEDING TFC LANDED AND ALMOST STOPPED ON THE RWY; AT WHICH TIME I SLOWED MY KING AIR 350 TO ITS SLOWEST POSSIBLE SPD AND SHALLOWED MY DSCNT TO PROVIDE MORE ROOM BTWN US. AFTER STOPPING ON THE RWY; THE TFC TURNED L AT TXWY S; CLRED THE RWY AND STOPPED. AT THIS TIME; MY ACFT WAS PAST THE THRESHOLD OF RWY 19L AT 50 FT AND LEVEL. UPON SEEING THE ACFT CLRING THE RWY; I CONTINUED MY APCH; AT WHICH TIME THE LNDG ACFT THEN ASKED THE CTLR WHICH WAY; L OR R. THE CTLR RESPONDED; GO R; AND THE TFC PULLED BACK ONTO THE RWY TO CROSS TO THE W SIDE. I WAS APPROX 1500 FT DOWN THE RWY AND BEGAN A GAR TO PREVENT A COLLISION. I ESTIMATE THAT IN PASSING THE OTHER ACFT ON THE RWY; I WAS APPROX 50 FT ABOVE AND 100 FT HORIZ TO THAT ACFT. AT THIS TIME; I SPOTTED THE ACR DEPARTING RWY 25 SO I BEGAN A TURN TO 270 DEGS TO AVOID ONE MORE CONFLICT. IT WASN'T UNTIL AFTER THIS TIME THE CTLR ISSUED HIS INSTRUCTIONS. IN CONCLUSION; 1) HAD THE CTLR LOOKED OUT THE WINDOW AND MONITORED HIS TFC; HE SHOULD HAVE UPON LNDG INSTRUCTED THE ACFT TO EXIT THE RWY TO THE R OR; 2) AFTER HEARING THE QUESTION; L OR R; HE SHOULD HAVE LOOKED OUT THE WINDOW AND RESPONDED; STOP; HOLD SHORT. IN CLOSING; I BELIEVE THE CTLR SIMPLY DIDN'T LOOK OUT THE WINDOW WHILE DOING HIS JOB. ALL ACTIONS TO AVOID A SERIOUS ACCIDENT WERE INITIATED BY MYSELF. THE CTLR WAS MERELY ISSUING INSTRUCTIONS IN HINDSIGHT TO WHAT HAD ALREADY TAKEN PLACE. HAD I BEEN IN AN ACFT OF LESSER PERFORMANCE; A RWY COLLISION WOULD HAVE OCCURRED RESULTING IN POSSIBLE FATALITIES.