E120 IN A CLOSE IN TRAIL SEPARATION FROM PRECEDING ACFT IN SID DEP PROC. AMENDED CLRNC ALT CHANGE AIRSPD ISSUED. FLC FAILS TO FOLLOW CLRNCS.

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THE FLT HAD JUST DEPARTED SAN ON A PART 121 SCHEDULED FLT FROM SAN TO BUR. THE FLT HAD BEEN ASSIGNED THE PEBBLE 2 DEP WHICH REQUIRES A 290 DEG HDG AFTER DEP AND AN ALT ASSIGNMENT OF 8000 FT. THE FLT HAD CLBED THROUGH APPROX 1000 FT WHEN THE SAN TWR TOLD US TO CONTACT DEP. WE ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT DEP BUT WERE UNABLE DUE TO CONGESTION ON THE FREQ AND THE DEP CTLR EVENTUALLY CONTACTED US. ON INITIAL CONTACT THE CTLR TOLD US TO SLOW IMMEDIATELY TO 150 KTS; AND I (AS THE PNF) ASKED THE CTLR WHAT TYPE OF ACFT WE WERE FOLLOWING IN HOPES OF ACQUIRING THE ACFT VISUALLY AND PROVIDE OUR OWN SEPARATION. AGAIN THE CTLR ADVISED US TO SLOW THE ACFT TO 150 KTS; WHICH THE CAPT (THE PF) WAS ATTEMPTING TO DO. AT THIS POINT IN THE FLT; THE ACFT WAS AT APPROX 200 KTS AND CLBING IN EXCESS OF 2500-3000 FPM. WHEN THE CTLR SAW THAT WE WERE NOT SLOWING QUICKLY ENOUGH; HE ASKED US TO STOP OUR CLB AT 4000 FT. THIS OCCURRED AT APPROX 4500-5000 FT. WE ATTEMPTED TO INFORM THE CTLR THAT WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH THE NEW ALT ASSIGNMENT; BUT WERE UNABLE TO CONTACT HIM DUE TO CONGESTION ON THE FREQ AND THE CAPT KEPT THE ACFT CLBING TO OUR ORIGINAL ASSIGNED ALT OF 8000 FT. WE WERE THEN VECTORED TO THE S TO AVOID CONFLICTING TFC AND EVENTUALLY VECTORED ON COURSE TOWARDS OUR DEST. THROUGHOUT THE FLT THE CAPT HAD THE CONFLICTING ACFT IN SIGHT AND WOULD HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH THE NEW ALT AND SPD ASSIGNMENT FOR THESE REASONS: 1) ALT -- THE FLT HAD ALREADY CLBED THROUGH THE NEWLY ASSIGNED ALT BY 1000 FT AND THE ACFT WAS CLBING IN EXCESS OF 2500 FPM AND WOULD HAVE SUBJECTED THE FLT ATTENDANT (WHO WAS MOVING ABOUT THE CABIN) TO POSSIBLE INJURY IF WE ATTEMPTED TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE DSCNT BACK TO 4000 FT. 2) SPD -- ON INITIAL CONTACT THE 150 KT SPD RESTR WOULD HAVE BEEN ATTAINABLE BY PITCHING THE NOSE OF THE ACFT UP AND INCREASING THE CLB RATE; BUT WHEN THE ALT RESTR WAS PLACED ON US THERE WAS NO WAY OF OBTAINING BOTH A DSCNT BACK DOWN TO 4000 FT AND SPD OF 150 KTS WITHOUT RETARDING THE THROTTLES TO FLT IDLE; EXTENDING THE LNDG GEAR AND EXTENDING A MINIMUM OF 15 DEGS OF FLAPS; WHICH IS UNDESIRABLE ON DEP CLBOUT. THERE ARE ALSO FACTORS ON THE SIDE OF THE CTLING AGENCY WHICH ALSO MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS OCCURRENCE AND THESE ARE ONLY SPECULATIONS ON MY PART CONSIDERING I DO NOT HAVE A WORKING KNOWLEDGE OF THE ATC SYS FROM A CTLR'S POINT OF VIEW. 3) THE CTLR'S LACK OF BASIC KNOWLEDGE OF OUR ACFT PERFORMANCE AND WHAT WE AS A CREW ARE CAPABLE OF REASONABLY ACCOMPLISHING WITH THE ACFT. 4) COORD BTWN THE TWR CTLRS AT SAN AND SOCAL DEP CTL BY ALLOWING A FASTER ACFT TO DEPART SO CLOSE BEHIND A SLOWER MOVING ACFT ON THE SAME DEP SID. 5) FREQ CONGESTION OR THE INABILITY TO QUICKLY CONVEY OUR ACCEPTANCE OR DENIAL OF A PARTICULAR CLRNC. THE CAPT; UPON REACHING OUR DEST; PHONED SOCAL APCH CTL AND SPOKE WITH THE SUPVR AND BOTH SIDES OF THE ISSUE WERE DISCUSSED. THE SUPVR ASSURED THE CAPT THAT ADEQUATE SEPARATION WAS NEVER COMPROMISED AND THAT HE WOULD NOT PURSUE THE MATTER ANY FURTHER.