TWR CTLR CLRS A BAE146 TO LAND ON RWY 15; THEN CLRS A CESSNA FOR TKOF IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION ON RWY 33. THE CESSNA PASSED APPROX 175 FT DIRECTLY BELOW THE BAE146 ON SHORT FINAL APCH.

Narrative

ON A VISUAL APCH TO ASE OUR ACFT WAS ABOUT TO ENTER A 3 MI FINAL APCH TO RWY 15. TWR ISSUED CESSNA TFC JUST DEPARTING RWY 33. WE COULD NOT VISUALLY ACQUIRE THE CESSNA AND CONTINUED THE APCH TRYING TO GET VISUAL CONTACT. THE TFC BECAME A TA ON OUR TCASII. VERBAL EXCHANGES BTWN THE CAPT (MYSELF) AND THE FO CONTINUED IN FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO VISUALLY ACQUIRE THE DEPARTING ACFT. TWR ADVISED US HE WAS STRAIGHT OUT OFF RWY 33 AND MAINTAINING 8000 FT MSL. FINALLY WE ACQUIRED THE CESSNA VISUALLY AND AT THE SAME TIME RECEIVED AN RA ON THE TCASII. AT THIS TIME OUR ACFT WAS CONFIGURED FOR LNDG AT MAX GROSS LNDG WT. THE CESSNA PASSED DIRECTLY BENEATH US BY 150-200 FT AND ON PERFECTLY OPPOSITE COURSES (COLLISION COURSE). WE LANDED NORMALLY AND DISCUSSED THE INCIDENT WITH THE TWR SUPVR. WE OPERATE AS MANY AS 17 FLTS A DAY FROM DEN-ASE IN THE BAE146. WE RECOGNIZE THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONDUCTING VISUAL APCHS AS WE DO THEM QUITE REGULARLY. WE ALSO ARE AWARE OF VFR VERSUS IFR OPS IN CLASS D AIRSPACE; BUT FIND IT TO BE TOTALLY UNSAFE AND BAD PROC/POLICY TO ALLOW 2 ACFT TO CONFLICT AS CLOSELY AS WE DID. ASE IS A SPECIAL ARPT REQUIRING SPECIAL TRAINING FOR OUR AIR CREWS; BUT ENCOUNTERING A SIT SUCH AS THIS IS ONE FOR WHICH WE ARE TOTALLY UNPREPARED. TO PURPOSELY ALLOW THIS CONFLICT TO DEVELOP (WHICH WAS THE CASE) IS GOING TO TEMPT FATE AND THE LAW OF AVERAGES.