FLC OF A B707-300 FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE MEL'ED PROVISIONS WHEN OPERATING WITH 1 REVERSER OPERATING LEVER WIRED TO PREVENT INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF THE REVERSER. A ROD SHOULD HAVE BEEN PLACED IN THE ENG TO PHYSICALLY PREVENT INADVERTENT DEPLOYMENT OF THE REVERSER AND A MAINT REPRESENTATIVE TO LEGALLY DISPATCH THE ACFT.

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ON THE MORNING DESCRIBED ABOVE; THE FLT WAS SCHEDULED TO DEPART MIAMI TO SANTO DOMINGO; DOMINICAN REPUBLIC; AT XA00. AFTER STARTING ALL 4 ENGS WE NOTICED THE #2 ENG REVERSE OPERATING LIGHT WAS FLASHING ON AND OFF. WE CONCLUDED IT WAS A MICROSWITCH PROB BECAUSE ON THE WALKAROUND OF THE ACFT THE ENG'S REVERSER WAS STOWED. WE PROCEEDED TO THE MEL. THE MEL STATED OUT OF THE 4 ENG REVERSE LIGHTS THAT ARE INSTALLED ONLY 3 HAVE TO BE OPERATING PROVIDED THE INOP REVERSER IS STOWED AND CANNOT BE OPERATED TO THE REVERSE POS. AFTER DISCUSSING THIS WE ELECTED TO PLACE SAFETY WIRE ON THE REVERSE OPERATING LEVER. THIS WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO ACTUATE THE ENG INTO REVERSE. WE NOW FELT WE WERE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE MEL SO WE COMMENCED WITH THE FLT. ENRTE; HOWEVER; AFTER FURTHER STUDY OF THE MEL WE DISCOVERED THAT WITH THE SIT WE HAD; MAINT WAS NEEDED. TO LEGALLY DISPATCH THE ACFT A ROD SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSERTED IN THE ENG TO PHYSICALLY PREVENT THE ENG FROM GOING INTO REVERSE. THIS WAS AN ERROR ON THE FLC TO INTERPRET THE MEL CORRECTLY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS ERROR ARE THE WAY THE MEL IS ORGANIZED. IT REFERS THE READER TO NUMEROUS PAGES RATHER THAN STATING SIMPLY WHAT MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED FOR DISPATCH. THE MAINT ACTION WAS OVERLOOKED DUE TO THE FACT THAT IT WAS WRITTEN IN AS A SUBNOTE FURTHER DOWN ON THE PAGE. THIS MISINTERP WAS NOT THE FIRST TIME I HAVE HEARD OF PLTS BEING CONFUSED BY THE MEL. SIMPLIFYING THESE MANUALS WOULD REDUCE CONFUSION IN THE COCKPIT AND ENHANCE AVIATION SAFETY.