S80 PIC SUSPECTED THAT A WHEELCHAIR; LOADED AT DFW AS A LAST MIN BAGGAGE TRANSFER; WAS NOT BOARDED IN ACCORD WITH THE ACR POLICY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL HANDLING. GND CREW CHKED AND REASSURED PIC THAT ALL WAS WELL. IT WAS NOT. POSTFLT CHK IN DEN REVEALED PROBS.
Synopsis
S80 PIC SUSPECTED THAT A WHEELCHAIR; LOADED AT DFW AS A LAST MIN BAGGAGE TRANSFER; WAS NOT BOARDED IN ACCORD WITH THE ACR POLICY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL HANDLING. GND CREW CHKED AND REASSURED PIC THAT ALL WAS WELL. IT WAS NOT. POSTFLT CHK IN DEN REVEALED PROBS.
Narrative
FLT DFW-DEN. WE RECEIVED HAZMAT FORM THROUGH COCKPIT SIDE WINDOW VIA STICK AS DOOR WAS CLOSED AT DEP TIME. I WAS CONCERNED THAT WHEELCHAIR WAS RUSHED ON AT THE LAST MIN AND ASKED THE GND CREW TO ENSURE THAT THE BATTERY WAS PREPARED PER HAZMAT REQUIREMENTS. THE GND CREW STATED IT WAS A DRY CELL AND DID NOT HAVE TO COMPLY. I KNEW THE BATTERIES WERE EITHER NICAD; LIQUID; LEAD/ACID; LIQUID; OR GEL/CEL; PASTE OR PUTTY ON THE WHEELCHAIR. TO MY KNOWLEDGE; NO WHEELCHAIR BATTERIES ARE DRY-CELL. I READ THE TUG OPERATOR THE REQUIREMENTS AND ASKED HIM TO AGAIN CHK TO SEE IF THE BATTERY WAS DISCONNECTED AND SECURED. HE SENT A HELPER BACK AND WHEN HE RETURNED THE TUG DRIVER SAID THE CABLES WERE DISCONNECTED FROM THE BATTERY. THE CREW CHIEF FAILED TO LOAD WHEELCHAIR DATA INTO THE COMPUTER; AND WE TOOK A 20 MIN DELAY AT RWY 17R WAITING LOAD CLOSE-OUT UNTIL THEY FOUND HIM AND GOT THE CLOSE-OUT TO REFLECT THE HAZMAT FORM. I HAD SUSPICIONS ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE WHEELCHAIR; SO RAMP WORKERS AT DEN AND MYSELF CHKED THE 3-WHEEL SCOOTER AT DEN ON ARR AND FOUND 2 FLUID BATTERIES; I BELIEVE LEAD/ACID; HOOKED UP TO 4 CABLES AND READY TO RUN. THIS IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH FAA DIRECTIVES OR COMPANY PROC AS FAR AS I KNOW. PROB #1: AGENT THAT CHKED SCOOTER; BAG IDENT XXX; DID NOT PROPERLY SECURE BATTERY CABLES AND CAP. PROB #2: PUSHBACK CREW MISINFORMED ABOUT HAZMAT LOADING OF WHEELCHAIR AND SCOOTER BATTERIES. THEY MISINFORMED ME ABOUT STATUS OF HAZMAT. PROB #3: LATE ARR OF HAZMAT FORM AND NOT LOADING RESTR ARTICLE INTO COMPUTER AT DFW CAUSED EXTENSIVE DELAY. THE BOTTOM LINE WAS THAT SAFETY WAS COMPROMISED. WE DIDN'T HAVE AN INCIDENT; BUT NOT BECAUSE WE ARE STANDARDIZED AND FOLLOWING SAFETY PROCS. DELAYS OF LOAD CLOSE-OUT VARIETY ARE UNNECESSARY AND COSTLY; 20 MIN DELAY.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.