B737-200 ACFT ON APCH; MISSED APCH AND MANEUVERING. CHK PLT OCCUPYING OBSERVER SEAT TO OBSERVE CAPT ON A SPECIAL TRACKING. RPTR FO; NOTING CAPT'S DIFFICULTY IN FLYING ALTS AND HEADINGS PLUS UNSTABILIZED APCH CALLED FOR A MISSED APCH BELOW 1000 FT. THEN CHK PLT SAID TO GAR AND CAPT DID. THE CAPT'S FLYING ABILITY WAS UNSATISFACTORY AND THE CHK PLT REMOVED HIM FROM THE RETURN LEG AND FLEW IT. RPTR FO WAS CONCERNED THAT THE CAPT DIDN'T LISTEN TO HIM; BUT DID RESPOND TO THE CHK PLT.

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I WAS THE FO ON A FLT FROM DENVER TO KANSAS CITY ON APR/THU/97. THE CAPT WAS BEING CHKED BY A LINE CHK AIRMAN WITH OUR COMPANY. THE REASON FOR THE CHK; WHICH I DID FIND OUT BEFORE THE FLT; WAS BECAUSE OF 'SPECIAL TRACKING' DUE TO A PREVIOUS TRAINING PROB. ALL PREFLT BRIEFINGS WERE COMPLETE AND THOROUGH; AND THE FLT PROGRESSED QUITE NORMALLY FROM PUSHBACK TO THE BEGINNING OF THE APCH INTO MCI. BECAUSE EVERY PERSON HAS HIS OWN INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS I FIND THAT I PAY EXTRA CLOSE ATTN TO CAPTS THAT I HAVE NO EXPERIENCE WITH UNTIL A DEG OF CONFIDENCE IS INSTILLED. THE FLT TO MCI WAS NO DIFFERENT THAN ANY OTHER. THIS CAPT WAS LIKE THE REST; DETAILED BRIEFINGS; SOLID KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE; GOOD PLANNING AND GOOD COMMAND. THE INITIAL APCH INTO MCI WAS WELL PLANNED. WE ENCOUNTERED LIGHT ICING CONDITIONS AND LIGHT CHOP IN THE DSCNT. THE WX NECESSITATED AN ILS RWY 1R APCH (WX: CEILING 700 FT BROKEN; VISIBILITY 1 1/2 MI RAIN; FOG). ONCE CLRED FOR THE APCH; EVERYTHING CHANGED. THE CAPT WAS HAND-FLYING THE APCH. WE ENDED UP HIGH ON THE GS (FULL SCALE DEFLECTION) AND BOTH L AND R OF LOC (FULL SCALE DEFLECTIONS). AIRSPD WAS UP TO 30 KTS FAST. AT 1000 FT THE ONLY THING WE HAD QUALIFYING FOR A STABILIZED APCH WAS THE GEAR DOWN AND FLAPS 30 DEGS. PASSING THE OM; I STATED THAT WE NEEDED TO GET STABILIZED NOW OR ABANDON THE APCH. THERE WAS NO RESPONSE SO I MADE SURE THERE WAS NO INCAPACITATION. FINALLY; AFTER WATCHING HIM GO THROUGH 1000 FT UNSTABILIZED IN IMC WITH NO INDICATION OF GOING AROUND; I STATED; 'LET'S GET OUT OF HERE; GAR.' WITHIN SECONDS; THE LINE CHK AIRMAN ALSO STATED; 'GAR.' LOOKING BACK; I'M NOT SURE THE CAPT WAS GOING TO INITIATE A GAR ON MY COMMAND WHICH WOULD HAVE REALLY BEEN AN INTERESTING SIT IF THE LINE CHK AIRMAN WAS NOT PRESENT. THE MISSED APCH PROC WAS FLOWN NORMALLY UNTIL LEVELOFF. WE OVERSHOT THE ASSIGNED 3000 FT ALT BY 350 FT. THEN; AFTER TRYING TO CORRECT BACK; WE OVERSHOT THE OTHER WAY REACHING AN ALT OF 2650 FT BEFORE WE FINALLY LEVELED OFF AT 3000 FT. DURING THIS EPISODE I RECOMMENDED TURNING THE AUTOPLT ON TO LET IT DO THE WORK; THEREBY ALLOWING US TO UNLOAD AND STRAIGHTEN THINGS OUT; NO RESPONSE AGAIN. FINALLY; AROUND 3000 FT; I TURNED THE AUTOPLT ON WITH ALT HOLD AND ANNOUNCED MY ACTIONS VERBALLY. WE WERE VECTORED BACK AROUND FOR ANOTHER APCH. FUEL WAS GOOD WITH 4500 LBS HOLD AND AN ALTERNATE IN MIND. WE AGREED ON THE USE OF THE AUTOPLT FOR A COUPLED APCH; REBRIEFED THE APCH AND ACCOMPLISHED CHKLISTS. WE WERE GIVEN A HDG CHANGE TO 080 DEGS FROM 190 DEGS. I BUGGED 080 DEGS; READ BACK 080 DEGS; AND THE CAPT TURNED TO 180 DEGS. I QUERIED HIM AND HE THOUGHT THE CTLR HAD SAID 180 DEGS; THE LINE CHK AIRMAN HAD HEARD 080 DEGS. BY THE TIME I GOT THROUGH TO APCH CTL; THE AIRPLANE WAS ESTABLISHED ON A 080 DEG HDG. WOULDN'T YOU KNOW THE CTLR SAID (OR THOUGHT HE HAD SAID) 180 DEGS; BUT DIDN'T CATCH MY INCORRECT READBACK. THE SUBSEQUENT APCH WAS NOT GREAT; BUT WORKED WELL ENOUGH. AFTER SHUTDOWN; WE WERE LEFT TO PREPARE FOR THE RETURN FLT TO DENVER. WITH WHAT LITTLE WAS SAID POSTFLT; ALL DURING MY PREFLT INSPECTION I WAS PONDERING IF THE CAPT WAS GOING TO FLY BACK AND; IF SO; HOW TO BEST SAY I WAS NOT GOING. AS I ENTERED THE COCKPIT THE CAPT SAID; 'YOUR LEG; I'VE GOT THE JUMP SEAT.' I HAVE SEVERAL CONCERNS ABOUT THIS SIT. I AM A RELATIVELY NEW FO -- 2 YRS ON THE B737. IN MY OPINION; I WAS SAFETY CONCERNED. DESPITE CAPT'S AUTH AND A RATHER IMPORTANT LINE CHK IN PROGRESS; I DID NOT ALLOW THE APCH TO CONTINUE BEYOND A SAFE LIMIT. BUT AS MENTIONED EARLIER; WHAT IF THE CHK AIRMAN WASN'T THERE TO REINFORCE THE GAR DECISION? AS I PONDER; I TRULY DON'T KNOW WHEN I WOULD HAVE PHYSICALLY INTERFERED AND FORCED THE GAR. I DO NOW. AFTER OBVIOUS SAFETY CONCERNS; MY NEXT THOUGHT WAS REGARDING MY STANDING WITH THE COMPANY. IF THE CAPT WAS PULLED OFF THE TRIP; WHAT ABOUT ME? WERE MY ACTIONS THROUGHOUT APPROPRIATE? IN ORDER TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION; I SOLICITED FEEDBACK FROM THE CHK AIRMAN; NOW OPERATING AS PIC GOING HOME TO DENVER. IN HIS RESPONSE HE SAID THERE WERE SOME SUBTLE THINGS I COULD HAVE SAID; SUGGESTED OR DONE THAT MAY HAVE HELPED THE CAPT WITH SITUATIONAL AWARENESS TO KEEP AHEAD OF THE ACFT AND FLY A SUCCESSFUL APCH THE FIRST TIME. BUT THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR WAS THAT I BECAME UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE ENTIRE SIT AND ACTED AS A FO WOULD BE EXPECTED TO ACT. MY NEXT CONCERN WAS WHERE WE STOOD WITH ATC GIVEN THE ALT AND HEADING DISCREPANCIES. I MUST POINT OUT NOW THAT FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE FIRST APCH THROUGH SETTING THE PARKING BRAKE WAS A VERY INTENSE; EXTREMELY HIGH WORKLOAD TIME WHERE MUCH OF MY TIME WAS SPENT ON THE INSTS. IT IS SAD TO SAY I HAD LITTLE CONFIDENCE AND A LOT OF CONCERN ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN NEXT. IT IS SOMEWHAT EMBARRASSING TO BE PART OF A CREW WHEN SOMETHING LIKE THIS HAPPENS. SITS LIKE THIS DO OCCUR; SOME GO UNRPTED; OTHERS HAVE WORSE RESULTS. BUT THE TRUTH IS; IT WAS A VALUABLE LESSON. I'VE LEARNED A LOT ABOUT MYSELF AND HOW TO BETTER RESPOND DURING FUTURE IRREGULARITIES. WE TAKE FOR GRANTED GOOD TRAINING; EXCELLENT EQUIP AND THE BEST AVIATORS AROUND; ALL OF WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO A DEG OF COMPLACENCY. IN THIS PARTICULAR SIT; THROW IN AN ENG FIRE OR SOME OTHER MALFUNCTION AND IT MAY GET DOWNRIGHT FRIGHTENING.