AN MD11 HAS A CATASTROPHIC ENG FAILURE ON TKOF FROM SUBIC BAY; DECLARES AN EMER AND LANDS AT MANILA.

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WE WERE OPERATING AN MD11. ON TKOF AT APPROX 100 FT AGL; THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHT ILLUMINATED. THE #2 ENG EGT WAS RISING. AT 1000 FT AGL IT HAD RISEN PAST THE RED LINE AND WE SHUT IT DOWN. AFTER CONFIRMING ENG OUT ON THE FMS WE RECEIVED A MESSAGE ON THE FMS SCRATCH PAD OF MULTIPLE ENG FAILURE. HOWEVER; THE OTHER 2 ENGS WERE OPERATING NORMALLY. EXPECTING AN IMPENDING SECOND ENG FAILURE; THE CAPT TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT. WE NEVER EXPERIENCED ANY PROBS WITH THE OTHER 2 ENGS. AT THIS TIME THE AUTOTHROTTLES REDUCED PWR; AND THE AIRSPD FELL TO FOOT PLUS 5 KTS. THE CAPT DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND PUSHED THE THROTTLES FORWARD. HE HAND FLEW IT TO RE-ESTABLISH V2 AND A CLB. HE RE-ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT; AND AGAIN THE AUTOTHROTTLES STARTED TO RETARD. HE DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT A SECOND TIME AND HAND FLEW THE ACFT THROUGH CLEAN-UP AND CLB TO 10000 FT. THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED A THIRD TIME. IT OPERATED NORMALLY TO OUR TKOF ALTERNATE OF MANILA. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THIS MD11 HAD A CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF #2 ENG DURING TKOF FROM SUBIC BAY. FO WAS FLYING; WHEN AT 100 FT AGL THE #2 EGT WAS IN THE AMBER TEMP RANGE. CAPT TOLD HIM THAT #2 ENG THROTTLE WAS BEING RETARDED TO KEEP EGT IN LIMITS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER THE AMBER INDICATIONS TURNED RED. CAPT DECIDED TO SHUT DOWN ENG. AS ENG WAS SHUT DOWN; THEY HEARD A BANG AND THEN FELT A SHUDDER OF THE ACFT. CAPT TOOK OVER FLYING THE ACFT AND ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT; WHICH SOON DISENGAGED. FO NOTED LOW AIRSPD AND THROTTLES WERE RETARDING. HE WAS NOT CERTAIN WHY ALL THIS WAS HAPPENING. HE SURMISED THAT CLEAN-UP ALT WAS 800 FT AND THE ACFT WAS DSNDING DOWN TO THAT ALT. HE ALSO STATED THAT NONE OF THE AUTOMATIC INDICATIONS WERE MAKING ANY SENSE TO HIM. HE WAS CONFUSED AT SEEING THE MARKING OF 'FOOT PLUS 5' ON THE CDU. BUT; THE AUTOTHROTTLES WERE RETARDING. PWR WAS ADDED WHEN CAPT MANUALLY SET THE AUTOFLT TO A PITCH AND LEVEL CHANGE MODE. PWR WENT TO MAX CONTINUOUS THRUST; ACFT WAS LIGHT (480000 LBS) AND 2 ENG CLBOUT PERFORMANCE RESUMED. WITH THE FAILED ENG SHUTDOWN; FLC MADE DECISION TO GO TO MANILA TO LAND. FLC WAS APPREHENSIVE ABOUT MAKING A NIGHT APCH INTO SUBIC BAY ON 2 ENGS. ACFT WAS LIGHT ENOUGH THAT PERFORMANCE WAS GOOD AND NO FUEL HAD TO BE DUMPED. WHEN THEY WERE ON THE GND THE FLC FOUND OUT THEY HAD A CATASTROPHIC ENG FAILURE. MANY FAN BLADES WERE MISSING; BUT NONE HAD PENETRATED THE ENG CASING. THE ENG FAILURE WAS COMPLETELY CONTAINED INSIDE THE ENG CASING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 368967: I ADVISED HIM I WAS RETARDING THE #2 THROTTLE TO TRY TO KEEP EGT WITHIN LIMITS. AT IDLE; THE EGT TURNED RED. I ELECTED TO SHUT THE ENG OFF IMMEDIATELY IN AN EFFORT TO MINIMIZE DAMAGE. AT SHUTDOWN THERE WAS A BANG AND THE ACFT SHOOK. I TOOK OVER FLYING AT THAT POINT. I ENGAGE THE AUTOPLT AND IT IMMEDIATELY DISCONNECTED. WE WERE AT ABOUT 1200 FT MSL. AT THE SAME TIME I NOTICED THE #1 AND #3 THROTTLES RETARDING. I ALSO SAW AN AMBER SPD TARGET BELOW MINIMUM MANEUVERING SPD AND A WHITE SPD TARGET 5 KTS ABOVE MINIMUM MANEUVERING SPD. THESE WERE UNCOMMANDED FMS ANOMALIES. THE SPD MODE APPARENTLY REVERTED TO SPD ON THRUST; CAUSING #1 AND #3 THROTTLES TO RETARD; TRYING TO SLOW TO THE ERRONEOUS SPD TARGETS. I THEN MANUALLY SELECTED 255 KIAS AND LEVEL CHANGE TO FL100. THIS PUT THE ACFT INTO SPD ON PITCH AND RESUMED MCT ON #1 AND #3 ENGS. ALT WAS TRADED FOR AIRSPD WHILE I SORTED ALL OF THIS OUT. IN ADDITION WE KEPT GETTING MCDU SCRATCHPAD ALERTS INDICATING WE HAD HAD A MULTIPLE ENG FAILURE. THIS WAS A VERY DISTRACTING FALSE ALERT. I RE-ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT. THE FO HAD ALREADY CONFIRMED ENG OUT ON THE #2 MCDU. THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED IN PROF/NAV/FMS SPD (SPD ON PITCH); ONCE AGAIN THE ALT; ROLL AND SPD FMA TURNED WHITE (MANUAL) AND FLASHED. THIS TIME I SAW SPD MODE REVERT TO 'THRUST.' AFTER FIXING THE MODES AGAIN I COMPLETED THE FLT WITHOUT PROF OR NAV. I CALLED FOR THE ENG SEVERE DAMAGE CHKLIST. WE CLEANED UP ON SCHEDULE AND CLBED TO FL100. THERE WAS NO FIRE/INDICATION; SO I ELECTED NOT TO EVAC.WE HAD DE- SELECTED SBA VOR FOR DEP. THIS WAS AN UNNECESSARILY COMPLEX EMER DUE TO COMPUTER SOFTWARE ANOMALIES. THE AUTOMATION IS SUPPOSED TO HELP. IN THIS CASE IT MADE THINGS MORE COMPLICATED.