A C150 PLT FLIES INTO CLOUDS AT NIGHT IN AN; APPARENTLY; DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO RETURN HOME. HE FINALLY DIVERTS AND LANDS.

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ON MAY/XA/97; I SPENT THE DAY IN LOUISVILLE; KY; WATCHING THE WX AND CALLING FSS. AT APPROX XA00L I MADE A NO-GO DECISION; RENTED A CAR AND BEGAN A DRIVE BACK TO DAYTON. 1 HR INTO THE TRIP I STOPPED AND CALLED FSS. THEY RPTED IMPROVING WX (CEILINGS INCREASED FROM 1200 FT TO 1800 FT) FOR LOUISVILLE. THE REMAINING RTE OF FLT HAD RPTED IMPROVING CONDITIONS. I RETURNED TO LOUISVILLE; RECEIVED ANOTHER RPT WHICH WAS AGAIN IMPROVING (CEILINGS INCREASED FROM 1800 FT TO 2300 FT). AGAIN; THE RTE OF FLT HAD EVEN BETTER CONDITIONS. I MADE A GO DECISION AND LAUNCHED FROM LOUISVILLE AT XF00. THE PROB BEGAN WITH NOT UNDERSTANDING HOW THE PUBLISHED AIRMET AFFECTED MY RTE OF FLT. THE AIRMET WAS FOR POSSIBLE IFR CONDITIONS IN SOUTHERN INDIANA. HOWEVER; I ASSUMED SINCE RPTED WX FOR EACH AREA SDF; CVG WOULD BE GOOD FOR A 50 NM RADIUS OF THE ARPTS; MY ENTIRE RTE WAS VFR (VMC) AND IMPROVING AT MY DEST. ONCE ENRTE; THE TURN N OF SHELBYVILLE WAS UNEVENTFUL. I DECIDED; HOWEVER; TO TAKE A SHORT CUT WITHIN 15 NM OF NABB VOR. I DECIDED TO FLY 360 DEGS; FOLLOW THE RIVER AND INTERCEPT THE 44 DEG RADIAL AND THEN CONTINUE TO I73. THE PROB WAS NOT IMMEDIATELY APPARENT. I FIRST ENCOUNTERED A BIT OF LIGHT CHOP; AND A FEW MINS LATER; PASSED DIRECTLY THROUGH A SMALL CLOUD. MY FIRST REACTION WAS TO DSND. AFTER INITIATING A DSCNT I REALIZED THAT I WOULD HAVE TO DSND AT LEAST TO 1500 FT. I DECIDED THAT THAT WAS TOO LOW FOR FLT; ESPECIALLY NIGHT FLT; CONSIDERING A WORST CASE ENG LOSS SCENARIO. I THEN DECIDED TO INITIATE A CLB TO BREAK OUT ON TOP; KEEPING IN MIND THE RPTED CEILINGS OF 2400 FT FOR LOUISVILLE AND 4100 FT FOR CINCINNATI. THE ENTIRE TIME I COULD SEE MY LAND REFS AND THOUGHT I COULD SEE FOR SEVERAL MI AT 2000 FT. AS I CONTINUED TO CLB; HOWEVER; I CONCLUDED THAT WAS A BAD IDEA FOR 2 REASONS: FIRST; THERE WOULD BE A LAYER OF CLOUDS BTWN ME AND THE GND (OR MY FRIEND THE ARPT). SECOND; I WAS NOT SURE HOW HIGH THESE CLOUDS WERE; OR IF THERE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT ROOM BTWN ME AND THE 2 LAYERS OF CLOUDS. I DECIDED TO TURN TO THE NNE VARYING BTWN 030-060 DEGS TO GET AWAY FROM THIS LINE OF CLOUDS. THAT WAS A BAD DECISION. FOR NOW THE SIT WAS NOT EXTREME; HOWEVER; WHEN I FLEW THROUGH A CLOUD THAT TOOK MORE THAN AN INSTANT TO FLY THROUGH AND I HAD ZERO VISIBILITY; I DECIDED TO TURN TO 180 DEGS AND GET OUT OF THIS SOUP. MY NEXT DECISION WAS CTRED AROUND MY FUEL. I HAD BEEN UP FOR APPROX 1 HR NOW (10-15 MINS IN IMC) AND DID NOT THINK I COULD MAKE I73 WITHOUT A FUEL STOP. I DECIDED TO FLY DIRECT FALMOUTH VOR AND THEN LAND AT LUK; REFUEL AND MAKE A DECISION TO STAY OR CONTINUE. 1/2 WAY TO THE FALMOUTH VOR; THE CLOUD LAYER DISSIPATED AND RETURNED TO CONDITIONS I EXPECTED FROM MY WX BRIEF. I DID NOT PERCEIVE THE SIT TO BE A MAJOR PROB UNTIL I HAD BEEN IN THE PROB AREA FOR A GOOD 5-10 MINS. THE REASON WAS I COULD NOT SEE ANY OF THE CLOUDS I WAS RUNNING INTO UNTIL I PASSED THROUGH ONE. I COULD STILL SEE LIGHTS A GOOD 5-7 MI AWAY. I TRIED TO CONTINUE ON MY RTE BY FLYING 45 DEGS OFF COURSE AND FLY AROUND THE AREA OF CLOUDS. THAT ONLY MADE IT WORSE. MY MAIN OBJECTIVE WAS TO GET HOME. THAT MAY BE THE ROOT REASON BEHIND THE LACK OF MAKING AN IMMEDIATE DIVERT DECISION. ONCE I DECIDED I WAS IN OVER MY HEAD; HOWEVER; I REVERTED TO MY LOST PROCS TRAINING AND DIVERSION DECISION. I DID FEEL THAT I HAD LOST THE BUBBLE ON WHERE I WAS FOR SEVERAL MINS AS I WAS JUST TRYING TO MAINTAIN STRAIGHT AND LEVEL FLT WHILE I WAS IN A MIX OF CLOUDS. ALSO AFFECTING MY DECISIONS WAS THE UNBELIEVABLE FEELING THAT I WAS IN A PLACE I SHOULD NOT BE (IE; IN OVER MY HEAD). ONCE I DID MAKE A DECISIVE DECISION TO GO TO LUK; I BEGAN TO RELAX AND CALM DOWN. NOT KNOWING WHERE I WAS GOING WAS THE WORSE PART OF THE SIT. THE BASIC LESSONS LEARNED WERE: REALIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT A WX BRIEF DOES FOR A XCOUNTRY FLT; UNDERSTANDING THE IMPORTANCE OF MAKING A DIVERT DECISION EARLY. WHY DID I NOT DO MY C'S? (CLB; COMMUNICATE; CONFESS; COMPLY). I THOUGHT INITIALLY THE SIT WAS NOT SEVERE ENOUGH; DID NOT WANT TO RISK LETTING SOMEONE KNOW I WAS IN A SIT I SHOULD NOT BE IN OR COULD NOT HANDLE (PRIDE).