FLC OF MLG OVERSHOOTS LOC APCH COURSE. APCH CTLR CATCHES THE ERROR AS DOES THE FO AND DIRECTS THE FLT BACK ON COURSE.

Date: 1997-06 · Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing · Phase: approach

Anomalies: deviation-track-heading-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance

Synopsis

FLC OF MLG OVERSHOOTS LOC APCH COURSE. APCH CTLR CATCHES THE ERROR AS DOES THE FO AND DIRECTS THE FLT BACK ON COURSE.

Narrative

CAPT FLYING; AUTOPLT ENGAGED; HDG SELECT MODE. HIS RADIO TUNED TO VOR (ON FIELD); MINE TO LOC. CLRED FOR APCH ON INTERCEPT HDG. I RAN THE APCH CHKLIST AND INFORMED CAPT TWICE THAT HE WAS STILL TUNED TO VOR FREQ. (WX WAS VFR; BUT HAZE OBSCURING RWY -- FIELD NOT IN SIGHT.) SINCE I HAD INFORMED CAPT THAT HE WAS TUNED TO VOR AND HE RESPONDED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE; I ASSUMED THAT WAS WHAT HE WANTED; FOR WHATEVER REASON. WHEN LOC CASE BREAK OCCURRED (MY SIDE) I CALLED 'LOC ALIVE.' HE RESPONDED 'ROGER.' I FIGURED HE HAD DECIDED TO FLY APCH IN HDG MODE. AS MY LOC STARTED TO SWING RAPIDLY; I STATED THAT WE NEEDED TURN NOW AS TO AVOID RWY 9 FINAL APCH PATH; WHICH WOULD RESULT IF WE OVERSHOT. AS I WAS MAKING THIS PRONOUNCEMENT; APCH CTL EMPHATICALLY ADVISED US THAT WE HAD OVERSHOT FINAL; AND HE GAVE US A CORRECTIVE HDG TO REJOIN. THE CAPT STARTED TO TURN BACK L; BUT VERY SLOWLY -- HE HAD 15 DEGS BANK SELECTED AND WE NEEDED 30 DEGS IMMEDIATELY. I FELT LIKE EVERYTHING WAS HAPPENING IN SLOW MOTION AND STARTED TO TAKE CTL OF THE ACFT WHEN THE CAPT FINALLY CAUGHT UP WITH THINGS; MUTTERED SOMETHING ABOUT 'NO WONDER IT DIDN'T CAPTURE; THE FREQ WASN'T SET!' THIS; AFTER I INFORMED HIM 3 TIMES THAT HE WAS STILL TUNED TO THE VOR. I WAS MONITORING TCASII THE WHOLE TIME AND DIDN'T SEE ANY POTENTIAL CONFLICTS. ANYWAY; THE CAPT BECAME MORE AGGRESSIVE IN HIS CORRECTION AND FINALLY ACQUIRED THE LOC. THE ARPT CAME INTO VIEW VERY SHORTLY AFTER THAT AT ABOUT 8 MI. 2 CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: I HAD FLOWN WITH THIS CAPT MANY TIMES AND KNEW HIM TO BE VERY COMPETENT WITH HIGH SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. I FEEL THAT THIS CAUSED ME TO LET MY GUARD DOWN -- I WAS ALSO VERY RELUCTANT TO TAKE THE ACFT. I THINK THE WX WAS ANOTHER FACTOR. BASICALLY VFR (9 MI) BUT HAZY. I THINK THE CAPT WAS THINKING HE WOULD PROBABLY SEE THE FIELD BEFORE HE WOULD ACTUALLY CAPTURE THE LOC. ATC NEVER INFORMED US OF ANY POTENTIAL CONFLICT. I WAS EXTREMELY FRUSTRATED -- WITH THE CAPT FOR NOT MAKING A MORE AGGRESSIVE CORRECTION WHEN INFORMED OF HIS ERROR (BY MYSELF AND ATC); AND WITH MYSELF FOR NOT BEING MORE ASSERTIVE. NEXT TIME; I WILL NOT WAIT AS LONG BEFORE BRINGING TO THE CAPT'S ATTN A POTENTIAL PROB; AND I WILL NEVER HESITATE TO TAKE THE ACFT IF I AM SURE WE ARE IN A DANGEROUS SIT.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.