FLC OF LGT OVERSHOT ALT ON CLB OUT. FO GIVES SEVERAL REMINDERS BUT CAPT IS CONCERNED WITH OPPOSITE DIRECTION TFC; NOT SIGHTED.

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DEPARTED S AT LGB RWY 12 (ATIS USING RWY 30). WINDS FAVORED DEP ON RWY 12. CLRED TO 4000 FT. ON CLB OUT AT ABOUT 2000 FT; WE WERE ADVISED OF TFC OPPOSITE DIRECTION ON ILS. CAPT (FLYING) BECAME TOO CONCERNED WITH WHY ATC HADN'T TURNED US AND WASN'T PAYING ATTN TO FLYING THE ACFT (HAND FLYING). I CALLED OUT STANDARD '1000 FT TO GO' CALL AND '3000 FT FOR 4000 FT ARMED.' HE WAS TALKING ABOUT ATC NOT TURNING US AND DIDN'T ACKNOWLEDGE LEVELOFF. AT 500 FT TO GO (3500 FT) AND CLBING 2000 FPM; I CALLED '4000 FT ALT' LEVELOFF. AGAIN; NO RESPONSE (THAT I COULD TELL). I THEN REACHED ACROSS AND TAPPED ON HIS ALTIMETER AND SAID 'THERE'S 4000 FT LEVEL!' WE WENT THROUGH 4500 FT BEFORE HE COULD REDUCE PITCH ENOUGH TO DSND BACK DOWN TO 4000 FT. ABOUT 15 SECONDS LATER; TFC CROSSED OUR NOSE AT 5000 FT NBOUND. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) CAPT'S INABILITY TO PRIORITIZE DUTIES AND SEE 'THE BIG PICTURE' COMPROMISES SAFETY ON CRITICAL ITEMS AND GETS TOO CONCERNED OVER TRIVIAL; UNIMPORTANT ONES. 2) OUR AIRLINE SETS QFE BELOW 10000 FT MSL AND HE MAY NOT HAVE RESET HIS ALTIMETER. CHKLIST CALLS FOR RESET AT 3000 FT. (PROC CREATES MORE PROBS THAN IT FIXES.) FIELD ELEVATION WAS CLOSE TO SEA LEVEL; SO DOUBTFUL THIS WAS MUCH OF A FACTOR.