MD80 EXPERIENCES AN ENG FIRE WARNING ON ENG #2'S LOOP 'A' AT FL330. PIC ELECTS TO DIVERT TO ICT. HE HAD ALSO ELECTED; WHEN PERFORMING THE ENG FIRE WARNING CHKLIST; TO NOT USE THE FIRE EXTINGUISHING SYS. THE FO ASKED HIM ABOUT THIS 3 TIMES DURING THE CHKLIST USE. THE #2 ENG LOOP 'B' WAS ON AN MEL DEFERMENT.

Date: 1997-08 · Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|other-unspecified

Synopsis

MD80 EXPERIENCES AN ENG FIRE WARNING ON ENG #2'S LOOP 'A' AT FL330. PIC ELECTS TO DIVERT TO ICT. HE HAD ALSO ELECTED; WHEN PERFORMING THE ENG FIRE WARNING CHKLIST; TO NOT USE THE FIRE EXTINGUISHING SYS. THE FO ASKED HIM ABOUT THIS 3 TIMES DURING THE CHKLIST USE. THE #2 ENG LOOP 'B' WAS ON AN MEL DEFERMENT.

Narrative

WE DEPARTED ABQ. FLT WAS ON AUG/XA/97. THE ACFT MAINT LOG REVEALED THE #2 ENG 'B' LOOP WAS INOP AND PROPERLY PLACARDED. THE MAINT LOG ALSO REVEALED NUMEROUS #2 ENG FIRE DETECTION PROBS WITHIN THE PREVIOUS SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO THE FLT. DEP FROM ABQ WAS WITHOUT INCIDENT. AT FL330; APPROX 20 NM SE OF THE LBL VOR; THE #2 ENG 'A' LOOP ILLUMINATED. WE COMPLIED WITH THE ENG FIRE CHKLIST; DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED TO ICT. A SINGLE ENG APCH AND LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITH NO FURTHER INCIDENT. THE ACFT WAS BROUGHT TO A COMPLETE STOP ON THE RWY. AN INSPECTION BY ARPT EMER VEHICLES REVEALED NO EXTERNAL DAMAGE. THE ACFT WAS THEN TAXIED TO THE GATE. WHILE ACCOMPLISHING THE ENG FIRE CHKLIST; THE CAPT SUSPECTED THE FIRE INDICATION TO BE FALSE AND WOULD NOT ALLOW THE EXTINGUISHERS TO BE DISCHARGED. ON 3 SEPARATE OCCASIONS WHILE ACCOMPLISHING THE CHKLIST; I ASKED THE CAPT ABOUT HIS DECISION NOT TO FIRE A BOTTLE. THE #2 'A' LOOP REMAINED ILLUMINATED UNTIL AFTER THE ACFT WAS SHUT DOWN AT THE GATE IN ICT. IT OCCURS TO ME THAT THE ENG FIRE LOOP DETECTION SYS IS THE ONLY MEANS AVAILABLE TO THE CREW TO DETERMINE IF A FIRE EXISTS. WHILE THE CAPT'S DECISION TO LAND AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT WAS PRUDENT (AND REQUIRED BY THE REGS) I BELIEVE HIS DECISION NOT TO ALLOW EXTINGUISHING AGENT TO BE DISCHARGED INTO THE ENG WAS FAULTY. ONE MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO ALLOW A PREVIOUS MAINT HISTORY TO TAINT THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS IN HANDLING SUCH A SIT; ESPECIALLY WHEN THAT DECISION IS LESS CONSERVATIVE. INTERESTINGLY; I HAD JUST BEEN THROUGH RECURRENT TRAINING A WK BEFORE THIS INCIDENT AND HAD FLOWN A SIMILAR LOFT SCENARIO. THAT RECENT EXPERIENCE CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TOWARD MAINTAINING AN EFFICIENT COCKPIT ENVIRONMENT WHEN THE WORKLOAD INCREASED WITH ACCOMPLISHING EMER CHKLIST; COMMUNICATING WITH ATC AND COMPANY; AND THE SUBSEQUENT DIVERSION. ATC PERSONNEL IN ZKC WERE BOTH PROFESSIONAL AND VERY HELPFUL. I CANNOT STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF BOTH THE COCKPIT AND ATC PERSONNEL WORKING TOGETHER TO BRING ABOUT A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO ANY ABNORMAL OR EMER SIT. ONE FINAL NOTE: AFTER INSPECTION BY MAINT; IT WAS REVEALED THE #2 'A' LOOP WAS INDEED FAULTY.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.