A PF A BL28 NOTICES; AS HE IS IN HIS LNDG ROLL ON A TURF RWY; THAT A SCHWEITZER 1-26 (GLIDER) IS ON SHORT FINAL FROM THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION FOR THE SAME RWY. HE TURNS OFF OF THE RWY AND APPLIES THE BRAKES A BIT TOO VIGOROUSLY AND HIS ACFT FLIPS OVER ON ITS BACK. SOME DAMAGE; BUT NO INJURY.

Narrative

WHILE FLYING A BELLANCA SCOUT; I TOWED A GLIDER (SCHWEITZER 1-26) FROM THE GRASS RWY OF WARREN/SKEETS UNCTLED ARPT TO AN AREA OF LIFT APPROX 5 MI FROM THE ARPT. THE GLIDER RELEASED AT 3000 FT. I RETURNED TO THE ARPT. I HEARD ANOTHER GLIDER (PILATUS B4) ANNOUNCE DOWNWIND POS FOR RWY 18. I DELAYED LNDG; DID NOT SPOT THE B4 UNTIL I LOCATED IT ON THE GND. IT HAD LANDED AND WAS AT THE W SIDE OF RWY; READY FOR GND TOW BACK TO THE FLT LINE. I THEN LANDED ON RWY 36. WHEN LIGHT OR XWINDS PERMIT; WE LAND THE TOW PLANE OPPOSITE GLIDERS TO EXPEDITE HOOK UP AND TOWING; TO AVOID THE TFC ON RWY 04/22; AND TO AVOID FLYING THE TOW ROPE OVER THE FLT LINE AND POSSIBLE STRIKES ON ACFT AND PERSONNEL. ON ROLLOUT; I SAW THE GLIDER WHICH I HAD JUST TOWED; APCHING ME TO LAND ON RWY 18 AT ABOUT 10 FT OF ALT AND 1000 FT DISTANCE. THE GLIDER ALTHOUGH RELEASED IN LIFT; HAD SOON ENCOUNTERED SINK AND RETURNED TO THE FIELD MUCH MORE QUICKLY THAN NORMALLY EXPECTED. THE 1-26 PLT EITHER HAD NO RADIO OR DID NOT ANNOUNCE POS. I BELIEVED THE 1-26 PLT TO BE A LOW TIME PLT. I THEREFORE DECIDED TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO INDICATE MY INTENTIONS AND CLR THE RWY AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE; SO THAT A CLEARER DECISION WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE 1-26 PLT. SINCE I WAS ON THE GND AND HAD PWR I ALSO HAD OPTIONS WHICH THE GLIDER PLT DID NOT. I WAS ON THE E SIDE OF RWY; I TURNED E TO THE R AND THE EDGE OF THE FIELD TO CLR THE FIELD AND THEN TO TAKE ACTION TO AVOID GOING INTO THE ADJACENT SOY BEAN FIELD ACROSS CULTIVATOR ROWS OR HITTING A RWY MARKER WHICH I WAS APCHING. ALTHOUGH I WAS NOT MOVING FAST AT THIS POINT; AND HAD THE STICK FULL AFT; THE APPLICATION OF VERY EFFECTIVE BRAKES ON THE SCOUT; TO MY GREAT SURPRISE; FLIPPED THE ACFT OVER ON ITS BACK. WHILE HANGING INVERTED IN THE 5 POINT HARNESS I TURNED OFF THE SWITCHES; COULD NOT FIND OR REACH THE FUEL VALVE IN INVERTED POS; EXAMINED THE WINDOW LATCH FOR OPENING PROC; OPENED THE WINDOW; SUPPORTED MYSELF WITH MY ARMS AND HANDS ON THE ACFT ROOF; RELEASED THE BELT HITCH; LOWERED MYSELF AND EXITED THE WINDOW UNHURT. THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS THAT I DID NOT SEE THE 1-26 IN THE PATTERN SOON ENOUGH. THIS WAS PRECIPITATED BY ITS UNANNOUNCED EARLY ARR; THE DIVERSION OF SEARCHING FOR THE B4; AND THE POS OF THE 1-26 BELOW ME AGAINST TERRAIN BEFORE I STARTED A RAPID DSCNT USING FLAPS AND SLIPPING. ONLY AFTER LNDG WAS I ABLE TO SEE THE 1-26 MORE EASILY AGAINST THE SKY. PREVENTATIVE MEASURES WOULD HAVE BEEN; CONSISTENT USE OF RADIOS AND RWY DIRECTION. 3 OPTIONS LATER OCCURRED TO ME WHICH MIGHT HAVE PREVENTED FLIPPING THE ACFT: GENTLER USE OF BRAKES; ALTHOUGH TIME AND THE INTENSITY OF NEED FOR ACTION MADE THIS QUESTIONABLE; INTENTIONAL GND LOOPING; OR TAKING A CHANCE ON XING THE CULTIVATOR ROWS. I HOWEVER; DID NOT EXPECT THE BRAKING ACTION; AT THE SPD I FELT I WAS TRAVELING; TO BE THAT INTENSE AND CAUSE THE ACFT TO FLIP ON ITS BACK. I REGRET DAMAGING THE SCOUT; HOWEVER I AM QUITE CERTAIN THAT HAD I NOT VACATED THE RWY AS QUICKLY AS I DID; THAT A COLLISION WITH THE GLIDER WAS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY. INJURY OR WORSE WOULD HAVE BEEN LIKELY.