FLC OF A WDB FORGOT TO RESET ALTIMETER ON DSCNT RESULTING IN OVERSHOOTING ASSIGNED APCH ALT. FLC RECOGNIZED THEIR ERROR AND CLBED BACK TO CORRECT ALT WITHOUT ATC INTERVENTION.

Date: 1997-09 · Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing

Anomalies: deviation-altitude-overshoot|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-other-unknown|other-unspecified

Synopsis

FLC OF A WDB FORGOT TO RESET ALTIMETER ON DSCNT RESULTING IN OVERSHOOTING ASSIGNED APCH ALT. FLC RECOGNIZED THEIR ERROR AND CLBED BACK TO CORRECT ALT WITHOUT ATC INTERVENTION.

Narrative

WE WERE APCHING THE NARITA ARPT OUTSIDE TOKYO; AT THE END OF AN INTL FLT THAT STARTED IN ANCHORAGE. OUR FLT HAD BEEN DELAYED AS A TROPICAL STORM PASSED THROUGH THE TOKYO AREA HRS BEFORE. THE WX WAS RAPIDLY IMPROVING; BECOMING VFR WITH GUSTY WINDS. APCHING NRT; WE WERE CLRED FROM FL160 TO FL110; PASSING THROUGH THE TRANSITION LEVEL OF FL140. IT HAD ALREADY BEEN MENTIONED IN THE APCH BRIEFING; THE IMPORTANCE OF SETTING THE LCL ALTIMETER OF 29.39 PASSING THROUGH FL140. JUST AFTER STARTING DSCNT FROM FL160; APCH CTL GAVE US HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS AT KAMSI INTXN. THE HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS CREATED CONFUSION; BECAUSE KAMSI INTXN WAS NOT LOCATED ON OUR CURRENT RTE OF FLT. THE OTHER CONCERN WAS DETERMINING HOW LONG WE COULD HOLD BEFORE PROCEEDING TO OUR ALTERNATE. DURING THE DSCNT FROM FL160 TO FL110 THE CREW'S ATTN WAS FOCUSED ON DETERMINING KAMSI INTXN LOCATION; PROPER HOLDING PROCS; PROPER HOLDING SPD AND LENGTH OF TIME WE COULD HOLD. AS WE LEVELED AT 11000 FT THIS WORK HAD BEEN COMPLETED AND WE WERE PROPERLY HEADING TOWARD KAMSI AND SLOWING WITH A 25 MIN WINDOW OF FUEL TO HOLD WITH PRIOR TO HEADING TO OUR ALTERNATE OSAKA; I WAS LEVEL AT 11000 FT FOR APPROX 4 MINS WHEN I REALIZED WE ALL HAD MISSED THE TRANSITION LEVEL. THE ALTIMETER READ 29.92 NOT 29.39. OUR ALT WAS ACTUALLY 10500 FT. I IMMEDIATELY RESET THE ALTIMETER AND CLBED TO 11000 FT. THERE WAS NEVER ANY MENTION FROM APCH CTL ABOUT THE ALTDEV. THE ACFT LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE FOCUSING ON THE HOLDING INSTRUCTION WHICH WERE NOT EXPECTED; DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF DSCNT; COULD HAVE CREATED A FAR MORE SERIOUS ALT INCURSION.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.