CTLR CLRED A CESSNA FOR TKOF WITH AN SMA ON SHORT FINAL APCH WITH CLRNC TO LAND. AFTER THE LNDG ACFT TOUCHED DOWN; THE CTLR ISSUED A GAR. THE SMA PLT DECLINED THE GAR DUE TO THE PROX OF THE CESSNA.
Synopsis
CTLR CLRED A CESSNA FOR TKOF WITH AN SMA ON SHORT FINAL APCH WITH CLRNC TO LAND. AFTER THE LNDG ACFT TOUCHED DOWN; THE CTLR ISSUED A GAR. THE SMA PLT DECLINED THE GAR DUE TO THE PROX OF THE CESSNA.
Narrative
UPON INITIAL CONTACT WITH THE TWR AT 12 NM E OF THE AIRFIELD; I WAS ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO ENTER A L BASE FOR RWY 21L AND RPT A 2 NM BASE. GEAR AND FLAPS WERE EXTENDED AT 6 NM (LORAN) ON BASE AND ALL LNDG LIGHTS WERE ILLUMINATED. AT 2.5 NM (LORAN) I MADE THE DESIGNATED POS RPT AND TURNED ONTO FINAL. THE TWR RESPONDED WITH 'CONTINUE' FOLLOWED BY 'CLRED TO LAND RWY 21L.' I READ BACK THE LNDG CLRNC. WX AND TFC VOLUME WERE NOT A FACTOR. AT 85 KIAS; 1.42 NM PER MIN; MY DISTANCE FROM THE RWY THRESHOLD WAS LESS THAN 1 MI. AT THAT TIME; AND AFTER ISSUING MY LNDG CLRNC; THE TWR CTLR CLRED A CESSNA AT THE RWY 21L 'HOLD SHORT' BAR TO 'TAXI INTO POS ON RWY 21L AND HOLD.' IF THE TWR HAD MY ACFT VISUALLY; AS REQUIRED; TO ISSUE MY LNDG CLRNC; THE OBVIOUSLY IMPENDING CONFLICT WOULD HAVE PRECLUDED CLRING THE CESSNA ONTO THE RWY. IT DID NOT. WHEN THE CONFLICT REQUIRED IMMEDIATE ACTION; LOGIC WOULD DICTATE INSTRUCTING ME TO GAR OR HAVE THE CESSNA TAXI CLR OF THE RWY. THE TWR CTLR DID NEITHER. INSTEAD; HE CLRED THE CESSNA FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF AND SAID TFC IS 1 MI ON FINAL. THAT WAS A FALSE STATEMENT. I CHOSE TO CONTINUE THE APCH AND SEE IF THE CESSNA WOULD BECOME AIRBORNE PRIOR TO MY TOUCHDOWN. THE CESSNA LIFTED OFF. I MADE THE DECISION TO LAND. WITH THE PWR OFF; AIRSPD DECREASING; AND IN THE FLARE -- I WAS COMMITTED TO LAND. AS MY ACFT TOUCHED DOWN; PRESCOTT TWR SAID 'GAR.' MY MAIN GEAR WAS ON THE GND; I HAD LNDG CLRNC. THERE WERE NO OBSTRUCTIONS ON THE RWY THAT WOULD INTERFERE WITH MY ROLLOUT. I REFUSED WHAT WAS; OSTENSIBLY; AN ORDER FOR ME TO TKOF; AND CONTINUED MY LNDG ROLL. IF I HAD ELECTED TO TKOF; I WAS CONFRONTED WITH AN IMMINENT AIRBORNE CONFLICT THAT I WOULD RAPIDLY OVERTAKE. A NORMAL DEP FROM THE RWY ENVIRONMENT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE. REMAINING ON THE GND WAS THE ONLY REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE. I ATTEMPTED TO DISCUSS THE INCIDENT WITH THE TWR OPERATOR. HE WAS ARROGANTLY DEFENSIVE AND CAVALIER ABOUT THE MATTER. I ASKED TO SPEAK TO THE SUPVR. THERE WAS NO SUPVR ON DUTY. I CONTACTED THE TWR CHIEF ON SEP/MON/97. HE RESPONDED IN A SIMILAR MANNER TO THE TWR CTLR AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT I CAUSED THE SIT TO OCCUR. HE DID NOT ELABORATE OR EXPLAIN HOW THAT WAS POSSIBLE. THE CONVERSATION WAS NOT CIVIL AND I TERMINATED IT. THE PRESCOTT CTL TWR HAS OPERATED IN THIS MANNER FOR QUITE SOME TIME. ALTHOUGH; I MUST SAY THAT AFTER OPERATING AT THE PRESCOTT ARPT FOR OVER 23 YRS; THIS IS THE WORST INCIDENT I HAVE BEEN EXPOSED TO. IN A CONVERSATION WITH THE ARPT MGR; HE CONFIRMED THAT THERE WAS A PROB; BUT HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC. OTHER PLTS HAD RPTED INCIDENTS. MINE WAS NOT A SINGULAR; ONE TIME; ISOLATED EVENT.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.