A DC8-73 BEGINS TAXI OUT FROM RAMP AT CVG; OH; ONLY TO HAVE TO APPLY MORE PWR FOR THE TAXI WHICH CAUSES BLAST DAMAGE BEHIND THE ACFT.

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AT XX05; FLT ABC BLOCKED OUT FOR LAX. ALL APPEARED NORMAL AT THE TIME. AFTER LNDG IN LAX; MGR ON DUTY INFORMED ME ABOUT A PROB DURING MY TAXI OUT IN CVG. HE AND I DISCUSSED THE PROB. UPON ARRIVING BACK IN CVG; MGR ON DUTY; MY CREW; A RAMP SUPVR AND I DISCUSSED THE INCIDENT IN DETAIL. AT THIS POINT; I BEGAN TO UNDERSTAND EXACTLY WHAT HAD HAPPENED. DETAILS OF THE PROB: 1) ALL 4 ENGS WERE RUNNING AND WE WERE TAXIING OUT OF SPOT XX UNDER THE DIRECTION OF A MARSHALLER. 2) I NOTICED THAT THE MARSHALLER WAS DIRECTING US TO PROCEED TOO FAR FORWARD AND BEGAN TO SLOW MY TAXI SPD. 3) THE COPLT THEN TOLD ME THAT THE MARSHALLER ON THE S END OF THE RAMP WAS TRYING TO ALERT OUR PRIMARY MARSHALLER TO SIGNAL US TO TURN R. 4) STEPS 2 AND 3 ONLY TOOK A FEW SECONDS TO OCCUR. I HAD ALMOST COME TO A FULL STOP JUST AS THE PRIMARY MARSHALLER SIGNALED US TO TURN R. BY THIS TIME; THERE WAS NOT ANY EXCESS ROOM TO COMPLETE THE TURN. 5) IN ORDER TO KEEP THE ACFT MOVING AND TURN AT THE SAME TIME; I VERY CAREFULLY AND SLOWLY APPLIED 43% THRUST TO ENG #1; 35% THRUST TO ENG #2; 30% THRUST TO ENG #3; AND 25% THRUST TO ENG #4. THESE NUMBERS ARE APPROX; BUT I BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE VERY CLOSE TO THE ACTUAL NUMBERS. HOWEVER; I AM CERTAIN THAT I NEVER EXCEEDED 43% N1. 6) I HAVE BEEN TOLD A CARGO CONTAINER WITH A PERSON INSIDE WAS BLOWN ACROSS THE RAMP FROM A POS LOCATED BEHIND THE ACFT'S #1 ENG AND ADJACENT TO THE REAR BELLY DOOR OF A B727 PARKED IN SPOT YY. I NEVER KNEW ANYTHING HAD HAPPENED UNTIL AFTER LNDG IN LAX. I BELIEVE THE CONFUSION ASSOCIATED WITH THE MARSHALLING OF THE ACFT DURING THE INITIAL TAXI FROM THE BLOCKS LED ME TO SLOW MY TAXI SPD; THUS REQUIRING ADDITIONAL THRUST DURING A R TURN AND RESULTING IN THE JET BLAST PROB. AFTER TALKING WITH THE RAMP SUPVR; I LEARNED THAT THE MARSHALLING TECHNIQUE DEPENDS ON ACFT MOMENTUM TO KEEP THE ACFT MOVING DURING THE R TURN; WITHOUT REQUIRING ANY THRUST DURING THE TURN. THE SUPVR STATED THAT THIS TECHNIQUE ALLOWS THE RAMP EMPLOYEES TO CONTINUE LOADING AIRPLANES; WHICH MIGHT BE LOCATED IN THE DIRECTION OF POTENTIAL JET BLAST. I HAD ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT THE MARSHALLERS CLRED THIS AREA; WHICH IS IN MY BLIND SPOT BEHIND THE ACFT; BEFORE WAVING AIRPLANES OUT OF THE BLOCKS. IN CONCLUSION; I DO FEEL BADLY THAT SOMEONE WAS POSSIBLY INJURED. AS A PROFESSIONAL PLT; I HAVE A HIGH REGARD FOR SAFETY. I CAN ASSURE THE COMPANY THAT I HAVE ALWAYS ADHERED TO THE LIMITS AND GUIDELINES SET FORTH IN ACFT OPERATING MANUAL; GENERAL OPERATING MANUAL; AND IN THE TRAINING THAT I HAVE RECEIVED. I BELIEVE THE PRIMARY FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE INCIDENT WERE THE CONFUSING MARSHALLING SIGNALS; AND A CONGESTED RAMP AREA. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 381835: OUR DC8-73 AT GROSS WT OF 305000 LBS REQUIRED A 90 DEG TURN TO THE R ON A SLIGHT UPHILL. POOR MARSHALLING INSTRUCTIONS HAD A LATE TURN; THEREFORE CAPT SLOWED DOWN TO ENSURE L WINGTIP WOULD CLR OBSTRUCTION TO HIS L. THIS CARGO RAMP IS CONGESTED AT THIS TIME OF NIGHT. TO KEEP ACFT MOVING CAPT ADVANCED THROTTLES ON OUTBOUND ENG TO 43% N1 (MAX ALLOWED BY GOM IS 45% N1). ON LNDG AT DEST WE WERE INFORMED THAT A CONTAINER WAS TOPPLED AND PUSHED WITH A PERSON INSIDE. NO MAJOR INJURIES SUSTAINED. BRUISES ONLY.